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Abstract 
This Article offers the first systematic attempt to measure the 
development of shareholder protection in the United States across time. 
Using three indices developed to measure the relative strength of 
shareholder protection across nations, this Article evaluates numerically 
the protections corporate and securities law have offered shareholders 
from the beginning of the 20th century to the present day. It accomplishes 
this by tracking the rights accorded to shareholders across time under 
three important sources of corporate law: Delaware and Illinois and the 
Model Business Corporation Act.  
This Article’s novel study yields novel results. First, we find that the 
protections afforded to shareholders by state corporation law have 
decreased since 1900 but only modestly so. This indicates that, contrary 
to the assumptions of many scholars, state competition in corporate law 
has not significantly eroded shareholder rights. Second, after adding in 
measures that count protections provided by federal as well as state law, 
we find that shareholder protection actually improved over time. This 
implies that federal intervention has played a crucial and perhaps 
underappreciated role in shaping U.S. corporate law. Beyond its specific 
findings, this Article illustrates how quantitative analysis of legal trends 
provides scholars with valuable insights regarding fundamental questions 
in corporate law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article constitutes the first systematic attempt to measure the 
development of shareholder protection in the United States across time. 
The study is set against a background of strong presumptions concerning 
both present levels of protection and trends over time. Corporate law 
scholars tend to assume that shareholders in U.S. public companies are 
poorly protected in relation to their peers in comparable countries. In a 
2005 article, Professor Lucian Bebchuk argued in favor of increasing 
shareholder power in U.S. corporations on the grounds that “the corporate 
law system of the United States . . . stands out among the corporate law 
systems of developed countries in how far it goes to restrict shareholder 
2
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initiative and intervention.”1 Professor Martin Gelter suggested in 2009 
that “U.S. corporate and securities law is highly unusual in the extent to 
which it disenfranchises shareholders from both explicit and implicit 
influence.”2 Professor Christopher Bruner, in a 2013 book contrasting 
U.S. corporate governance arrangements with those in other common law 
countries, indicated that among “[t]he defining attributes of U.S. 
corporate law are the shareholders’ marginal role and very weak 
governance powers.”3  
Underlying this view that U.S. shareholder protection is relatively 
weak is the assumption that the current situation is the product of a 
decline in shareholder rights across time. For instance, Professor William 
Roy observed in a 1997 book that since the rise of the industrial 
corporation, “stockholders and directors have gone to battle over many 
issues, and the directors have usually won.”4 Similarly, Professor Mary 
Sullivan argued in 2007 that shareholders’ statutory rights were 
substantially diminished between 1885 and 1930.5 Or as Professor Julian 
Velasco noted, “[t]he history of corporate law has been one of increasing 
flexibility for directors and decreasing rights for shareholders.”6  
If shareholder protection has indeed eroded over time, the logical 
culprit is the United States’ state-based system of corporate law. 
Companies are incorporated under the laws of one of the fifty states rather 
than under a federal statute, and a business can incorporate in a state other 
than the one in which it is headquartered.7 States correspondingly can, 
and at least to some extent do, compete for incorporation business by 
altering their corporate laws to attract incorporations, with Delaware 
being the clear winner.8 The regulatory competition that is a feature of 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833, 848 (2005). 
 2. Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and 
Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 134 
(2009). 
 3. CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: 
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 37 (2013).  
 4. WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL 
CORPORATION IN AMERICA 158 (1997). 
 5. Mary O’Sullivan, The Expansion of the U.S. Stock Market, 1885–1930: Historical 
Facts and Theoretical Fashions, 8 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 489, 529 (2007), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1467222700006182.  
 6. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 
407, 409 (2006).  
 7. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 3:2 (3d ed. 
2010).  
 8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554, 561 (2002); 
Mark J. Roe, Is Delaware’s Corporate Law Too Big to Fail?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 75, 76 (2008); 
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U.S. corporate law has sparked a widespread and enduring debate among 
corporate law scholars,9 with one study of leading law journals showing 
that more than half of all articles on corporate law discussed the topic.10 
There has been vigorous disagreement whether the “race” between the 
states has been to the “bottom,” in the sense that states have competed by 
adopting counterproductive manager-friendly laws, or to the “top,” in the 
sense that states have competed by adopting laws that served investors’ 
interests.11 It has been generally accepted, though, that this race has 
resulted in a net reduction in shareholders’ rights, either because states 
have been cynically watering down existing shareholder protection to 
appeal to managers—racing to the bottom—or because states have been 
displacing superfluous or inefficient rules—racing to the top.12  
While the general consensus has been that the Delaware-led 
competition between the states in the corporate law realm has prompted 
a substantial erosion of shareholder rights and thus shareholder 
protection, there have been dissenting voices. For example, Professor 
Walter Werner argued in 1977 that over the previous four decades, 
“[s]hareholders’ legal rights within the corporation have been made 
                                                                                                                     
see also John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 
1345, 1346, 1348 (2012). 
 9. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of 
Federalism for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 257 (2009) (referring to 
“corporate [law] literature’s singular emphasis on a race among states”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1794 
(2006); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the 
Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 381 (2005) (“Corporate law scholarship has focused 
on the role of the states as competitive actors in producing corporate law.”); Marcel Kahan, The 
State of State Competition for Incorporations 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper 
Series in Law, Working Paper No. 263/2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474658 (“The 
competition by states for incorporations has long been the subject of extensive scholarship.”). 
 10. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The (Misunderstood) Genius of American Corporate Law, 77 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 730, 731–32 (2009) (indicating that in a search of articles published in 
leading law reviews, almost three-quarters referred to topics relevant to regulatory competition).   
 11. Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701, 705 (1974) (arguing that there was a race to the bottom 
regarding corporate law), with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the 
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 275–76 (1977) (responding to Professor Cary’s 
argument with what became known as the race-to-the-top hypothesis), and ROBERTA ROMANO, 
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 19–22 (1993) (providing support for the race-to-the-
top hypothesis). For further discussion of this debate, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of 
State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 324 
(2004); Roe, supra note 8, at 76–77.  
 12. Roe, supra note 8, at 76–77; see also Ahdieh, supra note 9, at 263 (indicating that a 
leading critic of the “race to the bottom” view did not dispute the “observation of declining levels 
of shareholder protection”). 
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meaningful.”13 Professor Edward Herman suggested similarly in 1984 
that “corporate standards of behavior and attention to the welfare of the 
shareholders are substantially greater . . . than they were in 1925.”14 
Bringing the story up to date, activist hedge funds have successfully 
challenged boards of publicly traded companies in recent years, 
suggesting shareholders are hardly weaklings under U.S. corporate law. 
In 2014, the New York Times noted that these shareholder insurgents 
“have amassed huge war chests, to take on some of the biggest names in 
corporate America—and win more often than not.”15  
Werner and Herman both drew attention to federal securities 
legislation, first introduced in the mid-1930s,16 to buttress their claims 
that shareholder protection had become more robust during the 20th 
century.17 More recently, recognition of the federal dimension has 
fundamentally shifted the terms of debate on the merits of regulatory 
competition in the corporate law realm. In particular, Professor Mark Roe 
reframed the discourse by arguing that the federal government’s actions 
on the corporate governance front had done more to shape Delaware 
corporate law than had potential competition from other states.18  
Roe’s contribution, while insightful and influential, raises at least two 
significant, and as yet unanswered, questions. First, has the federal 
contribution to the shape of U.S. corporate law in fact been pivotal or 
only a side-show? Second, assuming that competition between states has 
over time diminished the rights corporate statutes provide to 
shareholders, has federal intervention bolstered shareholder protection 
sufficiently to cancel out moves in the other direction at the state level? 
                                                                                                                     
 13. Walter Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means 
Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 398 (1977). 
 14. Edward S. Herman, The Limits of the Market as a Discipline in Corporate Governance, 
9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 530, 538 (1984).  
 15. Michael J. de la Merced & Alexandra Stevenson, Sotheby’s Yields to Hedge Fund 
Mogul and Allies, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 6, 2014, 11:48 PM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/sothebys-and-loeb-end-fight-over-board/.   
 16. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp). 
 17. Herman, supra note 14, at 531, 538; Werner, supra note 13, at 398. 
 18. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591–93 (2003) 
[hereinafter Roe, Delaware’s Competition]; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2491, 2493–94 (2005). On the nature of Professor Roe’s contribution to the discourse, see 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1749, 1767 (2006); Note, The Case for Federal Threats in Corporate Governance, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2726, 2726 (2005). 
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With respect to the first question, Roe argues that “[t]here is a large 
federal presence in corporate law,”19 but this claim has been contested. 
For instance, Professor Roberta Romano has challenged what she has 
referred to as the “federal supremacy hypothesis,” saying that the 
dynamics of corporate law in the United States can still be explained best 
by the working of competition between states.20 Professors Marcel Kahan 
and Ed Rock struck a middle ground in a 2005 article, suggesting that the 
federal “threat” to Delaware is only potent at moments when, due to the 
political climate, federal lawmakers can reap populist political dividends 
by supporting corporate governance reform.21 
With the second question, again there is disagreement. According to 
some observers, the interaction between state-based corporate law and 
periodic federal intervention provides shareholders with ample and 
appropriate protection. Professor Brett McDonnell has suggested that 
under many circumstances, the United States’ mixed system of state and 
federal corporate law produces better results than a pure state or pure 
national system would yield.22 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court, maintains that investors benefit from a 
combination of Delaware courts enforcing fiduciary duties expertly and 
the federal government vigorously policing laws mandating disclosure to 
investors.23  
Other scholars are less sanguine. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani argue 
that, even when federal intervention is taken into account, “regulatory 
competition tends to produce insufficient investor protection.”24 
Professor J. Robert Brown, Jr., maintains similarly that “neither the states 
nor the federal government adequately regulates the behavior of officers 
and directors.”25  
Empirical analysis of the development of U.S. corporate law across 
time could help to resolve these controversies. As Professor Todd 
                                                                                                                     
 19. Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
1, 33 (2009).  
 20. Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate 
Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212, 213, 223 (2005).  
 21. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate 
Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2005). 
 22. Brett H. McDonnell, Recent Skirmishes in the Battle over Corporate Voting and 
Governance, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 349, 353 (2007); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 21, at 
1622 (“[Federal] regulations help ward-off crises and thus provide a lightning rod for a populist 
backlash that could produce severe harm to Delaware’s position as the creator of our de facto 
national corporate law.”).   
 23. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the 
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 686 (2005).  
 24. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 9, at 1796.   
 25. Brown, supra note 11, at 320–21.   
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Henderson has suggested, empirical research could bring “the debate 
down to the level of the real-world merits and applicability 
of . . . conflicting visions of corporate law.”26 Nevertheless, until now 
only a tiny handful of studies have attempted to measure quantitatively 
changes in U.S. corporate law over time, and those studies have typically 
sought to measure the pace of change rather than to quantify the level of 
protection afforded to shareholders.27 This Article breaks new ground 
with a pioneering empirical analysis that provides insights concerning the 
evolution of shareholder rights across time. It does so by measuring the 
evolution of shareholder protection from 1899 to the present day using 
“leximetric” tools developed to engage in quantitative measurement of 
corporate law.28  
To execute our historically-based leximetric analysis of the 
development of shareholder protection we draw upon methodologies 
developed by academics researching comparative corporate governance. 
In particular, we rely on three indices constructed to measure aspects of 
corporate law across national borders: (1) a six-element “anti-director 
rights index” (ADRI); (2) an “anti-self-dealing index” (ASDI); and (3) a 
ten-variable shareholder protection index constructed by an academic 
team associated with the Cambridge, U.K.-based Centre for Business 
Research (CBR SPI).29 We use each of these indices to measure 
shareholder protection under three different corporate law regimes: 
Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Business Corporations Act (Model 
Act)—the model statute promulgated by the Committee on Corporate 
Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association 
and adopted in whole or substantial part by more than thirty states.30  
To anticipate, our empirical analysis casts doubt on some aspects of 
the received wisdom concerning regulatory competition in the corporate 
law realm while affirming other aspects. Some caution is warranted in 
                                                                                                                     
 26. M. Todd Henderson, Two Visions of Corporate Law, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 708, 713 
(2009).  
 27. See Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. Bank & Harwell Wells, Law and History by Numbers: 
Use, but with Care, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1739, 1742–43 (discussing William J. Carney, The 
Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998) and Roberta Romano, The States as 
a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON 
REG. 209 (2006)).  
 28. Priya P. Lele & Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 J. 
CORP. L. STUD. 17, 18 (2007). The term “leximetrics,” described as the “systematic quantitative” 
analysis of law, was coined in a 2003 working paper by Robert Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, 
Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws Are Longer in Some Countries than Others (UNIV. OF ILL. LAW 
& ECON., Working Paper No. LE03-012, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=456520. 
 29. Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the World (Leximetric II), 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 111, 116–19 (2008).  
 30. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. 
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drawing inferences from the results. As we have acknowledged in prior 
related work, deploying leximetrics to measure U.S. corporate law 
accurately is challenging, particularly when one goes back through 
time.31 Nevertheless, leximetric analysis can generate sufficiently 
accurate scores to identify quantitatively key trends.32 Correspondingly, 
this Article’s empirical analysis is a valuable benchmarking exercise that 
provides novel insights into the development of shareholder protection 
over time.  
Part I of this Article sets the scene for our leximetric analysis. It 
explains why we chose the jurisdictions we did. It also describes our 
leximetric methodology, doing so in part by summarizing who makes law 
under the United States’ system of corporate law federalism.  
The leximetric analysis occurs in Part II. Here we identify formally 
the hypotheses we test, we set out the present-day ADRI, ASDI, and CBR 
SPI scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act and conclude by 
describing our historical results. Our core findings are that state law 
protections of shareholders have diminished since 1900, but not 
substantially, and that shareholder protection overall increased over time 
due to a federally prompted surge in shareholder rights.33 
With respect to state law trends, ADRI scores, which are governed 
purely by state law, drop over time but generally only modestly. The 
downward trend is what would be anticipated, given that competition 
between states on the corporate law front has reputedly eroded 
shareholder rights. On the other hand, the modest rate of change indicates 
that there was not much of a “race” between states in the period covered.  
When we take into account federal law trends using the ASDI and the 
CBR SPI, federal intervention was not only significant, but, contrary to 
what one would expect if vigorous state competition was eroding 
shareholder rights generally, more than offset any erosion of shareholder 
protection at the state level. Specifically, whereas the state-law-based 
ADRI scores of Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act dropped—albeit 
modestly—from 1899 onward, the aggregate ASDI and CBR SPI scores 
for these jurisdictions, which measure aspects of federal as well as state 
law, increased over time, dramatically in the case of the CBR SPI. 
Moreover, after taking into account federal reforms introduced either 
directly by the federal government or by national stock exchanges 
working in tandem with federal regulators, the level of shareholder 
protection the United States currently offers is—contrary to what 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1763. 
 32. Id.  
 33. See Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. Bank & Harwell Wells, Questioning ‘Law and 
Finance’: U.S. Stock Market Development, 1930–70, 55 BUS. HIST. 598, 605 (2013) (anticipating 
these findings in part). 
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observers such as Professors Bebchuk, Bruner, and Gelter imply—quite 
high by global standards. 
Part III offers a robustness check of our findings. One point we make 
in this Part is that while the indices we focus on have only been developed 
over the past two decades they provide a suitable departure point for 
analyzing trends extending back more than a century. Part III 
demonstrates this in part by using as a benchmark a fourteen-point list of 
shareholder rights promulgated in 1929, thereby countering the 
possibility that the variables in the indices we use are too modern to rely 
upon for historical analysis. Part III also identifies key changes to state 
law occurring during the 20th century to ascertain whether reform 
displaced the protection of shareholders in fundamental ways not 
captured by our indices or by the 1929 fourteen-point list. The analysis 
suggests, corroborating what the indices reveal about trends concerning 
state law, that while there was erosion of some forms of shareholder 
protection arising under state law, there was no decisive curtailing of 
shareholder rights. It seems that if the rights corporate law provided to 
shareholders were ever reduced markedly, this occurred primarily as the 
19th century drew to a close, rather than continuing during the 20th 
century.  
This Article concludes by underscoring the contributions it makes to 
theoretical debates concerning corporate law. It also acknowledges that it 
is left to others to gauge the normative implications of the trends 
identified. 
I.  METHODOLOGY 
 Part I sets the scene for this Article’s leximetric analysis. Sections I.A 
and I.B explain why we selected the indices we deploy and the 
jurisdictions on which we focus. Section I.C explains the coding 
protocols associated with the indices we deploy, and Section I.D provides 
an introduction to the variables associated with each index. Section I.E 
describes the types of rules taken into account with the scoring of each 
index. Section I.F canvasses the relevance of who makes the rules that 
potentially could be taken into account. 
A.  Selecting the Indices 
In the mid-1990s, as corporate governance first emerged as a topic of 
international interest,34 academics began to develop indices to quantify 
the protection the corporate laws of various countries offered investors. 
These efforts have continued to the present day. Here we deploy three 
                                                                                                                     
 34. On the relevant chronology, see generally Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate 
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46, 56–58 (Mike Wright, 
Donald S. Siegel, Kevin Keasey & Igor Filatotchev eds., 2013). 
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different indices originally developed for cross-country comparison to 
examine the development of U.S. corporate law over time.  
There are several reasons we chose to rely on existing indices rather 
than constructing an entirely new one. First, there is familiarity. Most 
readers likely already know of one or more of the indices used, which 
will increase the accessibility of the results. Second, drawing upon 
existing indices means this Article “speaks the same language” as the 
modern literature on quantitative analysis of corporate law. Thus, future 
scholars will be able to compare readily our historically-oriented results 
with those for a wide range of present-day jurisdictions. Third, relying on 
existing indices avoids the distraction of defending the effectiveness of a 
new index and maintains focus on correct historical coding rather than 
index comparison.  
The first of the three indices we deploy is the six element anti-director 
rights index. It was constructed in the mid-1990s by financial economists 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny.35 The second is the anti-self-dealing index which La Porta, 
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer developed in the mid-2000s with Simeon 
Djankov. It focuses on the regulation of transactions between a company 
and those who control it.36 The third is the CBR SPI, a ten-variable 
shareholder protection index Professor Mathias Siems constructed in the 
late 2000s with the Cambridge, U.K.-based Centre for Business 
Research.37 
Combining discussion of these indices risks deployment of a slew of 
acronyms referring to both indices and authors. At the risk of some 
confusion to the reader, this Article uses various acronyms because they 
have become standard in the scholarly literature. To clarify matters, the 
key acronyms are set out in Table 1. Drawing the elements together, 
LLSV produced the ADRI, DLLS produced the ASDI, and Siems–CBR 
produced the CBR SPI. 
Table 1: List of Acronyms 
Index or Author Group Acronym 
Anti-Director Rights Index ADRI 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny 
LLSV 
Anti-Self-Dealing Index ASDI 
                                                                                                                     
 35. The ADRI was initially fully deployed in a published paper in Rafael La Porta, 
Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (“LLSV”), Law and Finance, 
106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). A working paper version was distributed in 1996 as part of the 
NBER Working Paper Series: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5661.pdf.  
 36. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The 
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 442 (2008) [hereinafter DLLS]. 
 37. Siems, supra note 29, at 116–19.  
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Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
López-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer 
DLLS 
Shareholder protection index constructed by the 
Centre for Business Research 
CBR SPI 
Mathias Siems and the CBR academic team that 
constructed the CBR SPI 
Siems–CBR 
 
Why did we choose each index? With the ADRI, its wide acceptance 
strongly influenced us. The publication of the original ADRI in a 1998 
article sparked the development of a rapidly burgeoning “law and 
finance” literature oriented around quantitative comparative analysis 
which aims to trace the relationship between nations’ laws and legal 
institutions, on the one hand, and corporate governance outcomes, on the 
other.38 In the law and finance realm, the ADRI has achieved the greatest 
prominence with respect to the measurement of corporate law.39 As of 
2010, over one hundred academic papers had used the ADRI to test 
theories concerning the interaction between law and markets.40 
Correspondingly, for the quantitative analysis of the historical 
development of U.S. corporate law, the ADRI was an obvious metric to 
deploy.  
Relying solely on the ADRI, however, could yield a seriously 
incomplete picture. This index fails to take into account numerous key 
corporate law topics, including powers shareholders have to remove 
directors, the scope of shareholders’ managerial powers, and the legality 
of takeover defenses.41 It is hardly surprising that the ADRI is not 
comprehensive, given that it only has six components. This problem is 
compounded, however, because of the component selection process. 
Several years after the ADRI was first developed, three of its creators, La 
Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, writing in tandem with Djankov, 
conceded that the ADRI was “based on an ad hoc collection of 
                                                                                                                     
 38. See generally John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, How Do Legal 
Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker 
Protection, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 582–92 (2009) (giving an overview of this literature and its 
popularity). 
 39. Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Corporate 
Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1276 (2009) (stating that the ADRI was, 
“[a]mong academic researchers, the most influential metric for evaluating governance 
arrangements worldwide”).  
 40. Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467, 
468 (2010), http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/2/467.full.pdf. 
 41. Lele & Siems, supra note 28, at 20–21; see also Detlev Vagts, Comparative Company 
Law—The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JEAN NICOLAS DRUEY 595, 601 (Rainer J. Schweizer, 
Herbert Burkert & Urs Gasser eds., 2002).  
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variables.”42 Thus, the ADRI in isolation is a less than ideal proxy for the 
level of protection corporate law has provided for shareholders over time.  
Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (DLLS), when 
they criticized the original ADRI, were putting forward a second index 
designed to measure shareholder protections—the ASDI. There are good 
reasons why the ASDI should be part of a project to code shareholder 
protection historically.43 First, DLLS explicitly proffered this index as a 
superior alternative to the ADRI, saying that the ASDI dealt “with 
corporate self-dealing in a more theoretically grounded way.”44 Second, 
in empirical tests DLLS ran on the relationship between stock market 
development and corporate law, the ASDI delivered more robust results 
than the ADRI.45 Third, the ASDI has proven popular in its own right 
among those carrying out empirical law and finance research, and it could 
indeed be supplanting the ADRI as the most accepted numerical measure 
of the quality of corporate law.46  
Whatever the ASDI’s merits in comparison with the ADRI, because 
of its narrowness the ASDI is, in isolation, an insufficient measure of 
shareholder protection for this Article’s purposes. The ASDI addresses a 
solitary legal topic: the regulation of related-party transactions involving 
a company and its dominant shareholder, who is also a director.47 The 
underlying scenario is a classic example of the sort of conflict of interest 
that can bedevil corporations.48 Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to be 
confident that regulation of this particular topic will be broadly 
representative of the level of protection corporation law affords to 
shareholders.  
Because the ASDI’s narrow scope partly compromises its utility, the 
broad coverage of the CBR SPI provides a compelling rationale for using 
it as the third index. The CBR SPI encompasses ten variables, selected 
by the index’s creators partly because the variables represented the full 
range of shareholder protections used in the countries coded.49 The wide 
                                                                                                                     
 42. DLLS, supra note 36, at 432. 
 43. For a more detailed analysis, see generally Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 
1751–52.   
 44. DLLS, supra note 36, at 432. 
 45. Id. at 456–61.   
 46. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1752. 
 47. Id. at 1741.  
 48. Mary A. Jacobson, Interested Director Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects of 
Shareholder Ratification, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 986–87 (1996); Eric G. Orlinsky, Corporate 
Opportunity Doctrine and Interested Director Transactions: A Framework for Analysis in an 
Attempt to Restore Predictability, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 453 (1999).  
 49. John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An 
Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343, 353–55 (2009); 
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range of data taken into account by the CBR SPI potentially makes it a 
more reliable proxy for shareholder protection levels than either the 
ADRI or ASDI. 
Although the range of issues the CBR SPI addresses is wider than 
those covered by the ADRI or ASDI, it would be imprudent to use the 
CBR SPI as the exclusive measure of corporate law for this Article’s 
historically-related leximetric exercise. One consideration is that, 
whatever the CBR SPI’s merits might be as a corporate law index, it is 
not as well-known and has not been as influential as the ADRI and 
ASDI.50 Also, the CBR SPI’s designers selected variables thought to form 
the core of international corporate governance “best practice” between 
1995 and 2005.51 In so doing, they intentionally focused on a period when 
proposals to strengthen shareholder protection were high on the policy 
agenda in numerous countries and deliberately biased the selection of 
variables in favor of those expected to exhibit a relatively high degree of 
change during the decade selected.52 No explicit equivalent “present-day” 
bias affects the ADRI and ASDI, meaning that for a historically oriented 
study such as the one in this Article, they provide a useful cross-check 
against this feature of the CBR SPI.  
Minimal overlap between the three indices reinforces the utility of 
each as a cross-check against the others. For example, neither the ADRI 
nor the CBR SPI explicitly addresses rules governing transactions 
between a corporation and one of its directors or dominant shareholders, 
which means these indices cover different ground than the ASDI. There 
is overlap between the ADRI and the CBR SPI in that they both take into 
account the extent to which corporate law facilitates shareholder voting 
by way of proxies and the degree to which the law protects against 
minority shareholder oppression, defined largely in terms of the 
                                                                                                                     
Siems, supra note 29, at 116–19. The initial CBR SPI was a highly detailed sixty-variable index 
coded for five countries. Lele & Siems, supra note 28, at 23, 45–49.  
 50. The number of citations for each of the papers where the indices were initially deployed 
provides an admittedly crude illustration of this point. See Search Results for LLSV,  Law and 
Finance, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=La+Porta%2C+Lopez-de-Silan 
e%2C+Schleifer%2C+Vishny%2C+Law+and+Finance&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C10 (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2016) (17,321 citations); Search Results for DLLS, The Law and Economics of 
Self-dealing, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Djankov%2C+La+Porta% 
2C+Lopez-de-Silanes%2C+Shleifer%2C+The+Law+and+Economics+of+Self-Dealing&btnG= 
&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C10 (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (2286 citations); Search Results for Lele & 
Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google. 
com/scholar?q=Lele%2C+Siems%2C+Shareholder+Protection%3A+A+Leximetric+Approach&bt
nG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C10 (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (195 citations). 
 51. Armour et al., supra note 49, at 355, 374. 
 52. See id. at 353, 355.  
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procedure governing shareholder derivative suits.53 However, a majority 
of the six topics the ADRI addresses are not components of the CBR 
SPI.54 Similarly, the bulk of CBR SPI elements lack an ADRI 
counterpart.55  
In sum, each index used, in isolation, has drawbacks as a mechanism 
for measuring the historical development of U.S. corporate law. 
Nevertheless, taken together, the three indices canvass a wide range of 
mechanisms that afford protection to shareholders and collectively 
should offer a sufficiently representative picture of shareholder rights to 
allow for a fruitful historical analysis. This may be the best that can be 
achieved given the tools at hand. A more exhaustive empirical analysis 
of corporate law developments impacting shareholder rights is unlikely 
to be feasible because fully “[e]valuating the substance of state 
corporation laws [is] a daunting task.”56 
B.  Selecting the Legal Regimes 
When seeking to ascertain trends concerning shareholder protection 
in the United States, it would be unwise to restrict the analysis to one 
state. As William Roy has observed, historically “[s]tockholders’ rights 
were actively protected in some states and ignored in others.”57 Yet 
surveying all fifty states would be extremely difficult. Coding corporate 
law using the three chosen indices is a labor-intensive process involving 
not only careful research of the applicable law, but also difficult judgment 
calls on appropriate coding. The challenges multiply with historically 
oriented analysis because tracking down relevant statutory provisions, 
administrative rules, and case law back to 1900 is often far from 
straightforward.58 We therefore restricted our analysis to three legal 
                                                                                                                     
 53. The variables comprising both indices are identified individually below. See infra 
Section III.C. LLSV took account empirically of the regulation of multiple voting rights attached 
to shares—an element of the CBR SPI—but they did not treat this form of regulation as part of 
the ADRI. See LLSV, supra note 35, at 1126–27.  
 54. The elements of the ADRI are set out below. See infra Table 2. To anticipate, the 
components of the ADRI not addressed in the CBR SPI are the rights individual shareholders have 
to call shareholder meetings, the ability of companies to block share transfers immediately prior 
to shareholder meetings, the fostering of a director election system known as cumulative voting, 
and “preemptive” rights shareholders can be vested with in relation to the issuance of shares.  
 55. The CBR SPI components are summarized below. See infra Table 3. The CBR SPI 
components not part of the ADRI are the regulation of shares with multiple voting rights attached, 
requirements concerning the appointment of independent directors, and rules forcing shareholders 
to make a takeover offer after acquiring a large minority stake—a “mandatory bid.” 
 56. Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 J. CORP. L. 143, 153 
(2002). 
 57. ROY, supra note 4, at 156.  
 58. See Siems, supra note 29, at 116 (“[T]he compilation and coding of legal rules across 
time is very complex and time-consuming.”). See generally Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 
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regimes, namely Delaware, the Model Act, and Illinois. These three 
should nevertheless collectively provide a highly representative sampling 
of trends affecting U.S. corporate law.  
Delaware was an obvious choice, given that, for nearly a century, 
more publicly traded companies have been incorporated in Delaware than 
in any other state.59 The Model Act was also a clear choice, given that it 
is a highly influential model statute adopted substantially in more than 
thirty states.60 Due to the high degree of uniformity between the Model 
Act and the corporate law statutes of numerous states, it has been referred 
to as “the backbone of U.S. statutory corporate law.”61  
We chose Illinois primarily to foster continuity in the analysis. We 
scored Delaware’s corporate law back to 1899, the year when the state 
first enacted a new general incorporation statute intended to attract 
incorporation business.62 The first Model Act was not produced until 
1950, however,63 so we needed a proxy for state law developments 
occurring before the Model Act’s promulgation. We chose Illinois 
because the Illinois Business Corporations Act of 1933 was the primary 
precedent for the 1950 Model Act—partly because the principal drafters 
of the initial Model Act were from Illinois.64 Moreover, the 1933 Illinois 
legislation was considered to be innovative and influential in its own 
right65 and, seemingly contrary to the 20th century trend of states 
reducing shareholder rights in corporate law, was ostensibly structured to 
give shareholders more protections than the laws of Delaware and other 
                                                                                                                     
27, at 1748–51, 1759–63 (providing examples of the challenges involved with coding 
historically).   
 59. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 605. 
 60. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., intro. xix (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (stating that thirty-two 
states had adopted all or substantially all of the provisions of the current Model Act and four other 
states had statutes based on the 1969 version). 
 61. Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations 
from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 548 (2001); see also STEPHEN M. 
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 9 (2d ed. 2009) (“The most important alternative to Delaware law 
is the American Bar Association’s Model Business Corporation Act.”); Michael P. Dooley & 
Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act and the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737, 738 (2001) (referring to “[t]he relatively 
greater success of the Model Act in terms of adoptions”).  
 62. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 605. 
 63. COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 2:5, at 140 (“The Model Act first appeared in completed 
form in 1950.”); Romano, supra note 27, at 236 n.73 (2006) (“[T]he 1950 revision of [a 1946] 
draft statute is now considered the first Model Act.”).  
 64. Romano, supra note 27, at 236–37 n.73; West, supra note 61, at 543; Cf. Jeffrey M. 
Gorris, Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Delaware Corporate Law and the Model 
Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 109 
(acknowledging the Illinois influence but stating that the drafters used Delaware law as their 
primary departure point).   
 65. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 7 § 2:5, at 140; West, supra note 61, at 542–43. 
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“chartermongering” states.66 As with Delaware, we score Illinois law 
back to 1899.  
C.  Coding Protocol—In General 
For each of the three indices we have deployed the same coding 
protocol to score shareholder protection going back through time. We 
began with the present-day score for each of the three corporate law 
regimes—Delaware, the Model Act, and Illinois. Having ascertained the 
present-day scores for each, we worked backwards to identify changes to 
the law that would have caused the score for any of the relevant variables 
to move up or down. 
With one of our indices, the ADRI, our efforts were complicated by 
the fact that it has been reworked since its initial deployment. The ADRI 
that LLSV originally promulgated was significantly rescored not once but 
twice, by DLLS in a 2008 article and by Professor Holger Spamann for a 
project culminating in an article published the following year.67 The 
rationale for recoding and the key differences between the scoring 
methodologies for each version of this index are discussed below.68 For 
present purposes, it suffices to say that we took the scorings by DLLS 
and Spamann as our departure point and did not take LLSV’s analysis 
into account.  
In determining present-day scores for the ADRI, ASDI and CBR SPI, 
Delaware was the obvious place to start because reliable present-day 
                                                                                                                     
 66. Harwell Wells, The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920–1940, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 573, 576, 594 (2009). While the fact that Illinois has reputedly placed more emphasis on 
shareholder rights than other states helps to explain the focus on this jurisdiction, continuity with 
the Model Act was the key consideration. If the primary concern was to trace developments in a 
state with a reputation for protecting shareholders, California would be a better choice. A 
significant proportion of the largest U.S. companies are incorporated under California law; as of 
the mid-2000s, twenty percent of Fortune 500 companies were incorporated in California 
compared with sixty percent incorporated in Delaware. Matt Stevens, Note, Internal Affairs 
Doctrine: California Versus Delaware in a Fight for the Right to Regulate Foreign Corporations, 
48 B.C. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2007). Also, California has long had a reputation for having corporate 
law that offered significant protection to shareholders. See Andrew J. Collins, Comment, Choice 
of Corporate Domicile: California or Delaware, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 103, 106 (1977); Francis G. 
Wilmarth, Comment, Choice of a Corporate Domicile, 49 CAL. L. REV. 518, 523–27 (1961). On 
the other hand, California has never been influential as a source of corporate law nationally in the 
same way as Delaware and the Model Act. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ 
Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 396 (2003) (“California appears unable to 
‘sell’ its corporate law system to any significant number of out-of-state firms . . . .”); Guhan 
Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the 
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1854 (2002) 
(remarking upon California’s “poor showing in the market for corporate charters”). 
 67. DLLS, Law and Economics, supra note 36, at 461; Spamann, supra note 40, at 477. 
 68. See infra Section I.E.  
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scoring for Delaware was readily available for all three indices. The 
ADRI was already scored for Delaware because the authors who 
developed or reworked that index—LLSV, DLLS and Spamann—had 
taken Delaware as representative of U.S. corporate law.69 The ASDI and 
CBR SPI were also already scored for Delaware because both DLLS and 
Siems and his Centre for Business Research co-authors likewise treated 
Delaware as their proxy for U.S. corporate law.70  
With Delaware’s present-day scores we drew verbatim from the work 
of DLLS, Spamann, and Siems–CBR. Since we adopted the scoring from 
each source without variation, even if we had qualms about how a 
particular variable was scored, we refrained from recoding. We scored 
Illinois and the Model Act ourselves, although whenever the applicable 
rule in these jurisdictions was substantially similar to Delaware’s, we 
used the Delaware coding of DLLS, Spamann, and Siems–CBR to 
promote consistency.  
Given the extensive borrowing from DLLS, Spamann, and Siems–
CBR, one might assume that ascertaining present-day scores would be a 
straightforward exercise. On the contrary, identifying the suitable scores 
posed various challenges that influenced the approach taken with 
historical scoring. The remaining Sections in this Part illustrate that point 
in the course of summarizing the key elements of the ADRI, the ASDI, 
and the CBR SPI and identifying the sources of law that need to be taken 
into account when coding shareholder protection using each index. 
D.  The Relevant Variables 
 To ascertain appropriate present-day coding for the ADRI, ASDI and 
CBR SPI, we identified each index’s variables and each variable’s basic 
scoring regime. This Section describes each index in detail. 
1.  ADRI 
 The ADRI, which was constructed and initially deployed by LLSV 
in a 1998 Journal of Political Economy article to compare the protection 
afforded by corporate law to shareholders in forty-nine countries,71 has 
six variables, each described briefly in Table 2.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 69. DLLS, supra note 36, at 454; LLSV, supra note 35, at 1119; Spamann, supra note 40, 
at 472 n.12. 
 70. DLLS, supra note 36, at 442 (ASDI); Siems, supra note 29, at 120 (CBR SPI).  
 71. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1147–49.  
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Table 2: ADRI Elements 
ADRI Variable Definition 
Vote by Proxy 
Allowed 
The ability of shareholders to mail in a proxy vote rather 
than to vote only in person at a meeting of the 
shareholders.72 
No Block 
The absence of a requirement that shareholders intending to 
vote their shares at a shareholder meeting deposit those 
shares before the meeting, rendering them nontransferable.73 
Cumulative 
Voting 
The availability of cumulative voting, which permits 
minority shareholders to “bundle” their votes and thereby 
increases the likelihood that they can elect their 
representatives to the board of directors.74 
Oppressed 
Minority 
The availability of mechanisms offering relief to minority 
shareholders who have been oppressed or unfairly 
prejudiced.75 
Preemptive 
Rights 
Rules obliging a company to give existing shareholders a 
right of first refusal when issuing new shares.76 
Ability to Call 
General Meeting 
The ability of shareholders owning ten percent or more of a 
company’s shares to call an extraordinary shareholders’ 
meeting.77 
 
LLSV awarded jurisdictions either “0” or “1” for each variable, with 
a higher cumulative score for a country signaling a more shareholder-
friendly legal regime.78 The maximum score any country could receive 
was “6,” although “5” in fact was the highest score that LLSV awarded.79 
When DLLS recoded the ADRI for forty-nine countries for the purposes 
of their 2008 article, they scored the law as of 2003.80 The highest score 
they awarded remained “5.”81 The DLLS recoding, however, often 
changed the scores awarded to individual countries for particular 
variables, with the correlation with the original LLSV coding being 
0.60.82 Also, while LLSV scored each ADRI variable as either “0” or “1,” 
                                                                                                                     
 72. Id. at 1127.  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1128. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. DLLS, supra note 36, at 432. 
 81. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law 
and Economics of Self-Dealing: Data, HARVARD UNIV., Revised Antidir tab (2008), http://scholar.harv 
ard.edu/files/shleifer/files/data_for_web.xls?m=1360042200 [hereinafter DLLS, Data] (showing that 
nine countries were awarded a score of “5”). 
 82. DLLS, supra note 36, at 455. 
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DLLS allowed a score of “0.5” for the oppressed minority shareholder 
variable where this improved the accuracy of coding.83 
2.  ASDI 
For DLLS the primary purpose of their 2008 article was not to recode 
the ADRI but rather to deploy a new measure of corporate law, the ASDI, 
for which they assessed the law of seventy-two countries.84 The departure 
point for coding the ASDI is a hypothetical transaction implicating self-
dealing.85 This transaction involves Buyer Co., a publicly traded food 
manufacturer of which a Mr. James is both a director and sixty-percent 
shareholder.86 Following a proposal by Mr. James, Buyer Co. agrees to 
purchase an unused fleet of trucks from Seller Co., a privately held 
retailer of which Mr. James is a ninety-percent shareholder.87 Though all 
required approvals were obtained and all required disclosures made, 
Buyer Co. shareholders sue on Buyer Co.’s behalf the interested parties 
and the body that approved the transaction.88 
To measure the law governing their hypothetical self-dealing 
transaction, DLLS compiled two anti-self-dealing indices, one measuring 
public enforcement—fines and other criminal sanctions—and the other 
measuring private enforcement—civil remedies.89 They evaluated public 
enforcement by assessing whether Mr. James and the approving parties 
could be fined or imprisoned as a result of what had occurred.90 Though 
we have investigated how scoring under the public enforcement index 
developed over time we do not report the results here.91 This is because 
the public enforcement index has attracted considerably less interest than 
the private enforcement index, due partly to only the latter index being 
correlated in a meaningful way with measures of stock market 
development.92 
The ASDI private enforcement index is made up of two subindices, 
one addressing ex ante private control of self-dealing and the other ex 
post.93 The ex ante index, which focuses on regulation of the process by 
which the sale of the trucks could be validated, deals with requirements 
                                                                                                                     
 83. Id. at 455 tbl.9. 
 84. Id. at 432.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 433. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 435. 
 90. Id. at 436. 
 91. For a discussion of the trends with the public enforcement index, see generally Cheffins, 
Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1754.  
 92. DLLS, supra note 36, at 451.   
 93. Id. at 434–35 tbl.1.  
 
19
Cheffins et al.: Shareholder Protection Across Time
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
710 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
for advance disclosure of the proposed transaction by Mr. James and 
Buyer Co. as well as for an independent review of the transaction by a 
financial expert or auditor.94 The ex post index, which measures the ease 
with which minority shareholders of Buyer Co. could establish potential 
wrongdoing in the courts after the transaction had been entered into, deals 
with requirements Buyer Co. would face to disclose the transaction, 
standing to sue, burden of proof, and access to evidence.95  
As with the ADRI variables, the variables in the ASDI private 
enforcement index are scored between “0” and “1.”96 In some instances, 
such as with a requirement for an independent review, “0” and “1” are 
the only possible scores.97 More often, allowance is made for the 
possibility of intermediate scores, with the range usually limited to “0,” 
“0.5,” and “1.”98 For instance, with the advance disclosures Mr. James 
had to make for validation of the hypothetical transaction to be possible, 
a country would score “0” if no disclosure was required, “0.5” if only the 
conflict of interest had to be disclosed, and “1” if all material facts had to 
be divulged.99  
3.  CBR SPI 
The ten-variable CBR SPI is the third and final index we deploy.  
Siems–CBR initially deployed the CBR-SPI to score corporate law in 
twenty countries from 1995 to 2005,100 and then subsequently used it to 
score corporate law in thirty countries from 1990 to 2013.101 As shown 
in Table 3, the index addresses five basic categories, each associated with 
two of the ten variables.102 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Id.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Siems, supra note 29, at 116; Armour et al., supra note 49, at 353.  
 101. Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder 
Protection: Leximetric Evidence for 30 Countries, 1990–2013, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 127, 129–30 
(2015); Mathias M. Siems, The Leximetric Research on Shareholder Protection, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER (Jennifer Hill G. & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). 
 102. Siems, supra note 29, at 116–19.  
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Table 3: CBR SPI Elements 
CBR SPI Category Variables  
Shareholder Power at Shareholder 
Meetings 
Shareholders’ right to vote collectively on 
sale of the company’s assets. 
 
Minority shareholders’ rights to 
require that that an item be put on a 
shareholder meeting agenda.103 
Shareholder Voting 
Fostering effective shareholder voting by 
making it possible for proxies to be sent by 
mail and by requiring the use of “two way” 
proxies that give a shareholder the 
possibility of voting “yes” or “no.” 
 
Regulation of shares with multiple voting 
rights.104 
Encouraging Directors to Take Shareholder 
Interests into Account 
Regulation of board composition in the form 
of independent director requirements. 
 
Rules regarding shareholder dismissal of 
directors before the expiration of their 
term.105 
Legal Actions Minority Shareholders Can 
File 
Minority shareholders’ ability to enforce 
breaches of duty by way of derivative suits. 
 
Shareholders’ ability to challenge 
shareholder resolutions.106 
Change of Corporate Control Protection 
Imposing on a shareholder who 
acquires a large stake in a 
corporation an obligation to offer to 
buy the remaining shares. 
 
Disclosure requirements for acquirers of 
large-share ownership stakes.107 
 
Consistent with the other indices, each CBR SPI variable is scored on 
a range between “0” and “1.”108 Like the revised ADRI and the ASDI, 
the CBR SPI forsakes strict binary “0” and “1” coding.109 The CBR SPI 
indeed goes further to accommodate intermediate scoring, with the 
intention being to provide a more accurate picture of the law.110 Although 
                                                                                                                     
 103. Id. at 119.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 116–19.  
 109. Id. at 120.  
 110. Id. 
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the revised ADRI and the ASDI permit non-binary options only when 
explicitly identified, such as “0,” “0.5,” and “1,” those coding the CBR 
SPI were prepared to give a wide range of intermediate scores for every 
variable.111 For instance, while the description of the CBR SPI variable 
dealing with independent directors indicates that the scoring options are 
“1” if at least half of the board must be independent directors, “0.5” if 
25% of the board must be independent, and “0” otherwise,112 Siems–CBR 
awarded China 0.4 for 2002 and 0.6 for 2003 to 2005.113 
E.  Which Types of Rules Qualify?  
When deciding how to score legal rules going back through time, we 
had to take into account the form those rules took. Corporate law rules 
fall into three basic categories: mandatory; default or presumptive 
(applicable unless there has been a waiver or other form of “opting out”); 
and enabling or permissive (inapplicable unless there has been “opting 
in” by specific election).114 When LLSV coded the original ADRI, they 
failed to distinguish explicitly between these categories.115 In contrast, 
when DLLS recoded the ADRI in 2008, they ignored enabling rules, 
meaning that a country would only receive a positive score when its 
corporate law had a default or mandatory rule providing the relevant 
protection to shareholders.116 The creators of the CBR SPI similarly 
awarded points only for mandatory and default rules.117 DLLS did not 
indicate specifically which rules they focused on with the ASDI, but 
because they were seeking to measure “hurdles” that had to be jumped,118 
they should not have taken into account permissive enabling rules.  
                                                                                                                     
 111. MATHIAS SIEMS ET AL., CBR EXTENDED SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INDEX 4 (2009), 
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/resear 
ch-projects-output/Shareholder%20protection%20index%20references%2025%20countries.pdf. 
 112. Siems, supra note 29, at 117.  
 113. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 34.  
 114. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 217–20 
(1997).  
 115. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 454.  
 116. Id.  
 117. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 3–4 (indicating that only mandatory laws were counted 
with respect to rules precluding shares with multiple voting rights and requiring a shareholder to 
make a takeover bid for all shares upon acquiring a specified percentage of shares). Professors 
Dionysia Katelouzou and Mathias Siems, working with CBR SPI data, subsequently categorized 
legal rules that were elements of the CBR SPI as “enabling” and “paternalistic.” Katelouzou & 
Siems, supra note 101, at 132. In so doing, they were not attempting to revamp the basic typology 
of corporate law rules set out here but rather were distinguishing between those CBR SPI rules 
that automatically imposed the rights in question on shareholders—“paternalistic”—and those 
where shareholders had to be proactive to exercise the rights they had been given—“enabling.” 
See id. 
 118. DLLS, supra note 36, at 432. 
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 Changing the types of rules that count can significantly alter scores 
awarded. In 1998, LLSV gave the United States an overall score of “5” 
for the ADRI, with the only “0” occurring because shareholders lacked 
preemptive rights under Delaware law, which LLSV focused on to code 
the United States.119 In Delaware, a corporation is authorized to “opt in” 
to give shareholders cumulative voting rights and the right to call an 
extraordinary meeting.120 LLSV gave the United States a “1” for both 
variables, but when DLLS recoded the ADRI in 2008, they coded both as 
“0” because the rules governing these areas of the law were enabling 
rather than presumptive or mandatory.121 This meant the aggregate score 
for the United States dropped from a “5” for LLSV to a “3” for DLLS.122 
Since DLLS themselves treated the revised ADRI as superior to the 
original, we decided to adopt the same approach to enabling rules and 
excluded laws of this type from consideration when coding the ADRI 
going back through time.  
Given how DLLS scored the ADRI for the United States, it might 
seem that “3” would be the obvious present-day baseline for historical 
research on Delaware. Spamann’s recoding of the ADRI, however, 
provides an additional wrinkle. Like DLLS, he discounted enabling rules 
and so awarded the United States “0”s for cumulative voting and for the 
calling of shareholder meetings.123 Spamann, however, awarded the 
United States a “2” rather than a “3” overall because he adopted a tougher 
standard than DLLS for awarding a “1” for proxy voting, a standard that 
Delaware failed to meet.124 Spamann’s coding of Delaware law provides 
as credible a departure point for our analysis as does DLLS’s coding, so 
we correspondingly decided to rely on both.  
F.  Who Made the Rules? 
As part of our exercise of determining present-day coding before 
working backwards, we needed to determine not only the form of the 
relevant rules but also their source. The ADRI was scored purely by 
reference to “company and bankruptcy/reorganization laws” and 
excluded securities law and stock exchange listing rules.125 LLSV were 
                                                                                                                     
 119. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1119, 1130.  
 120. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1746–47. 
 121. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 607.  
 122. Id. at 606. 
 123. Spamann’s article does not provide an element-by-element breakdown of ADRI scores 
for the United States or any other country. For this data, see Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector 
Rights Index” Revisited: Supplementary Data, REV. FIN. STUD. (2010), 
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/suppl/2009/09/24/hhp067.DC1/ADRI_RFS.xls. 
 124. See Spamann, supra note 40, at 474 & n.22.  
 125. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1120. 
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prepared, however, to factor in judicial rulings when scoring 
jurisdictions.126 For instance, they explicitly drew attention to the U.S. 
derivative suit as an example of a legal mechanism that afforded 
shareholders protection against perceived oppression, and its contours are 
defined primarily by case law.127  
At first glance, it seems there is no need to go any further than LLSV 
did in identifying the laws that offer shareholder protection in the United 
States. Corporate law constitutes the most obvious source of shareholder 
rights, and the relevant statutes are promulgated at state level.128 While 
proposals to provide for federal incorporation predate the adoption of the 
U.S. Constitution,129 Congress has consistently resisted calls to provide 
for federal incorporation, leaving the matter instead to the states.130 Each 
state has in turn promulgated a general corporate statute establishing the 
procedure for incorporating businesses and providing the ground rules 
governing the internal affairs of already incorporated companies.131 
When a corporation is incorporated under the laws of a particular state, 
that state’s corporate law will be applicable notwithstanding where the 
principal place of business might be. The laws of the state of 
incorporation will be determinative due to a choice of law rule known as 
“the internal affairs doctrine” which does much to sustain Delaware’s 
status as the leading supplier of corporate charters.132  
The internal affairs doctrine has also formed the basis of an 
understanding among federal and state lawmakers that has done much to 
shape U.S. corporate law. The key precept is that the internal affairs of 
corporations fall within the purview of state law and are not a proper 
subject for federal regulation.133 Some judicial rulings imply that due to 
the nature of the U.S. federal system, the internal affairs doctrine is 
                                                                                                                     
 126. Id. at 1126. 
 127. Id. at 1128; see also Armour, Black & Cheffins, supra note 8, at 1349 (describing the 
prerequisites for bringing a derivative suit in Delaware as a “judicial construct”). 
 128. Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay out of Corporate 
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 732 (2013); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping 
Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., Spring 2003, at 26, 26 (“For over 200 years, corporate 
governance has been a matter for state law.”).  
 129. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Federalism, 
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 652–53 (2006).    
 130. Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the 
First State as First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779, 784 (2004) [hereinafter Thompson, 
Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange]; Robert B. Thompson, Delaware’s Disclosure: 
Moving the Line of Federal-State Corporate Regulation, U. ILL. L. REV. 167, 177 (2009). 
 131. Wells, supra note 66, at 573.   
 132. Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. 
CORP. L. 33, 39, 42–43 (2006).  
 133. Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate 
Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 882 (2006).  
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constitutionally mandated.134 This in fact is not the case. The correct view 
is that federal corporate law-making authority is very broad and that 
Congress could if it wished federalize corporate law largely without 
limit.135  
Constitutional potentialities aside, over most of U.S. history, Congress 
steered clear of enacting federal corporate law. There was no meaningful 
federal contribution to U.S. corporate law until the enactment of the 
Securities Act of 1933136 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,137 
which established the federal Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).138 Even these important pieces of legislation ultimately 
constituted only a tentative foray by Congress into the corporate law 
realm. Although the SEC would subsequently argue that key aspects of 
the 1934 Act authorized it to create rules that directly affected the 
governance of corporations, such as regulation of shareholder voting 
conducted by proxy,139 this was not the consensus view at the time the 
federal securities law reform was undertaken.140 The standard assumption 
was that federal regulation should target trading markets with disclosure 
and anti-fraud rules—“securities law”—thereby leaving “corporate law” 
relating to the internal affairs of companies to the states.141 The legislative 
history relating to the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts indeed 
indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize federal securities 
regulators to interfere in the management of companies.142   
This pattern began to change in the late 20th century. Between the 
1968 enactment of the Williams Act,143 which amended section 14 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to impose a range of obligations on 
parties making a tender offer to acquire shares,144 and the close of the 
20th century, there were various federal incursions into the corporate law 
                                                                                                                     
 134. COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 2:13, at 172; Greenwood, supra note 9, at 413; Roe, 
Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 596.  
 135. Fisch, supra note 128, at 737–38; Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 597.  
 136. Pub. L. No. 73–22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)). 
 137. Pub. L. No. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp).  
 138. Id. § 4(a).  
 139. Patrick Moyer, The Regulation of Corporate Law by Securities Regulators: A 
Comparison of Ontario and the United States, 55 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 43, 49 (1997).  
 140. See id. 
 141. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 624–25. During the 1930s, a variety of tax 
provisions were enacted that appeared to be motivated at least in part by the desire to affect 
corporate governance, but these were usually defended on tax policy grounds as well. See Steven 
A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1159, 1163–64 
(2004).  
 142. Moyer, supra note 139, at 49–50.  
 143. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 
(2012)).  
 144. See id. at 454–57.  
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realm. Laws and regulations were adopted fostering disclosure of 
transactions involving publicly traded companies going private, 
discouraging the listing of dual-class shares and deregulating proxy 
requirements to facilitate institutional shareholder voice.145 Federal tax 
provisions also limited the tax deductibility of executive 
compensation.146  
These post-1968 incursions would soon be overshadowed, however, 
by the most ambitious federal corporate law initiative to date. The game-
changer was the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),147 which Congress 
enacted in response to high-profile corporate scandals involving 
companies such as WorldCom and Enron.148 As Mark Roe observed in a 
2003 article where he emphasized the federal government’s impact on 
competitive federalism, “with [SOX] in 2002, Congress did not even 
pretend to stay on the disclosure-and-trading side of the rhetorically 
traditional federal-state division of power, not even offering perfunctory 
respect for state rules governing the corporation’s internal affairs.”149  
The nature and depth of SOX’s corporate law content was something 
of a shock to those who had assumed the states’ preeminence.150 SOX 
made key changes that included creating the possibility of executive pay 
“clawbacks” where there had been problematic restatements of corporate 
earnings, prohibiting corporate loans to senior executives, requiring CEO 
certification of financial reports filed with the SEC, granting the SEC 
formal authority to regulate the structure and duties of board committees 
dealing with the audit function, and giving the SEC explicit powers to 
formulate accounting standards.151 
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010 (Dodd–Frank Act)152 constituted another substantial federal 
incursion into the corporate law realm. While this post-financial crisis 
legislation focused primarily on the regulation of banks, it contained a 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 616, 620–21. 
 146. Bank, supra note 141, at 1161. 
 147. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, 
and 29 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 148. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 664–65. 
 149. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 633. 
 150. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 667–68 (noting that the “off-handed but 
emphatic revision of the internal affairs line drawn after 1934 . . . upset settled expectations”).   
 151. Brown, supra note 11, at 358–71; see also Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” 
to “Mixed Governance” in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes–Oxley, 53 BUFFALO L. REV. 
721, 724–25 (2005) (discussing the SOX auditing requirements in depth). See generally Brian R. 
Cheffins, Introduction, in 1 THE HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE xxvi (Brian 
R. Cheffins ed., 2011) (providing background on why SOX was enacted and the controversial 
response its enactment received).  
 152. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 
and 15 U.S.C.). 
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subtitle entitled “Strengthening Corporate Governance” applicable to all 
issuers falling under the SEC’s jurisdiction, not just financial 
companies.153 This subtitle amended federal securities law to instruct the 
SEC to introduce rules requiring companies that had not split the chief 
executive officer and chairman of the board roles to explain why and to 
authorize the SEC to develop a “proxy access” rule permitting 
shareholders with significant stakes to nominate directors on a company’s 
own proxy card under prescribed circumstances.154 Another subtitle of 
Dodd–Frank, dealing with executive compensation,155 amended federal 
securities laws to mandate an advisory “say on pay” shareholder vote and 
additional compensation disclosures for all publicly traded companies 
subject to SEC jurisdiction.156 
The ADRI, due to its exclusive focus on state corporate law,157 does 
not take account of securities law-based federal initiatives that might 
bolster shareholder protection. The situation is different with the ASDI 
and the CBR SPI, which both factor in a wider range of laws and 
correspondingly can reflect rules promulgated outside the state context. 
With the ADSI, DLLS coded by reference to “stock market act(s) and 
regulations” (i.e. securities law) and stock exchange listing rules, as well 
as corporate legislation and judicial precedent.158 With the CBR SPI, 
Siems and his colleagues similarly took into account federal securities 
law and stock exchange listing rules in addition to state corporate law 
statutes and case law.159  
To simplify rule categorization, this Article treats all laws not 
promulgated at state level as “federal,” in the sense that they apply 
nationwide. Who are the relevant federal rule makers? Congress 
obviously is one. Though there is no federal incorporation legislation, 
since the early 1930s Congress has periodically enacted statutory 
measures as part of federal securities law that operate as de facto 
corporate law.160 The SEC is another rule maker. As the administrative 
agency charged with administering federal securities law, the SEC 
promulgates regulations and issues rulings pursuant to the statutory 
                                                                                                                     
 153. See id. §§ 971–72.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. §§ 951–57.  
 156. See id. § 951 (explaining shareholder voting on executive compensation); § 953 
(discussing disclosure). Of the provisions in Title IX, Subtitle E governs all publicly traded 
companies subject to SEC jurisdiction save for § 956, which requires disclosure of executive pay 
arrangements to regulators only if it is one of several “covered financial institutions.” Id. § 956. 
 157. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1120. 
 158. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 433. 
 159. See Siems, supra note 29, at 120 (explaining the coding process used in the research).  
 160. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
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mandate under which it operates.161 Federal courts are a third rule maker, 
as they interpret federal securities law and SEC regulations and rulings.162  
Beyond the official governmental realm, there are private actors—
leading national stock exchanges—whose rules are taken into account in 
ADRI and CBR SPI coding and which this Article treats as generating 
“federal” rules. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), for instance, is 
a private body, not an agency of the federal government. Nevertheless, 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the NYSE, operating as a 
national securities exchange and self-regulatory organization under the 
Act, to submit listing rules governing companies traded on the NYSE to 
the SEC for approval.163 Also, the SEC can amend the NYSE’s listing 
rules to further the purposes of the 1934 Act.164 The SEC thus has 
substantial power to ask, and even direct, the NYSE to make rules that 
affect shareholder protections.165 Indeed, Professor Robert Thompson, in 
discussing NYSE listing rule amendments promulgated from the late 
1970s onwards dealing with governance-related topics such as 
shareholder voting rights, board composition, and shareholder approval 
of executive pay, has said, “Without the SEC’s leadership, the exchanges 
would not likely have entered into the arena of corporate governance.”166  
II.  HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS 
The historically-oriented leximetric investigation of U.S. corporate 
law that forms the core of this Article allows us to analyze numerous 
aspects of shareholder protection under corporate and securities law. To 
ensure our empirical research directly addresses the key issues, we have 
generated a series of specific, testable hypotheses set out in Section II.A. 
Section II.B sets out present day scores for Delaware, the Model Act and 
Illinois under the ADRI, the ASDI, and the CBR SPI.  Section II.C 
examines historical trends.   
A.  Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Shareholder protection index scores, to the extent 
they reflect state law, should decline over time. The first hypothesis, and 
perhaps the most obvious, that can be tested by using the ADRI, ASDI, 
and CBR SPI to measure shareholder protection over time is that scores 
should decline over time, at least when measuring state corporate law. 
                                                                                                                     
 161. Roe, supra note 19, at 11.  
 162. Id.   
 163. Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 19(b), 48 Stat. 881, 898 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s 
(2012)). 
 164. See id. § 19(c). 
 165. Roe, supra note 19, at 11.   
 166. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange, supra note 130, at 795–97.  
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The corporate law “race” rhetoric used to characterize the evolution of 
the law, whether to the top or bottom, connotes movement.167 Moreover, 
given the general consensus that competition among states for 
incorporation business in the twentieth century served to erode 
shareholder rights while enhancing managerial flexibility,168 shareholder 
protection scores dictated by state law should have fallen.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Shareholder protection index scores, to the extent 
they reflect federal law, should increase over time. While the standard 
narrative is that shareholder rights have eroded over time, various 
observers have cited reform at the federal level to argue that shareholder 
protection was in fact bolstered from the 1930s onwards.169 Assuming 
these observers are correct, one would expect that federally influenced 
shareholder protection scores should have risen. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): If changes to federal law heavily influenced the 
scoring of individual components of shareholder protection indices, these 
indices’ aggregate scores should have increased over time. Due to 
growing recognition of the role the federal government has played, the 
conventional wisdom concerning state dominance of the U.S. system of 
corporate law federalism has been shifting over the past decade.170 The 
extent of federal influence, however, is open to debate.171 If this influence 
was substantial, then federal intervention fortifying shareholder rights 
may have been enough to more than offset any erosion of those rights at 
the state level, meaning the overall level of shareholder protection would 
have increased.  
All three of these hypotheses can be tested with the ASDI and the 
CBR SPI. This is because these indices are scored not only by reference 
to state corporate law, but also by reference to securities law and rules 
developed by key players at the federal level, namely the SEC and 
national stock exchanges.172 With the ADRI, the fact that coding occurs 
purely by reference to state corporate law means that scoring over time 
can only be used to test H1.  
B.  Present-Day Scores 
Given our methodology, which involves determining present-day 
coding before working backwards,173 the scoring begins with considering 
each jurisdiction’s present-day score under the selected indices. This not 
only constitutes the foundation for our historical analysis, but also 
                                                                                                                     
 167. See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 609.  
 168. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.   
 169. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.   
 170. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.  
 171. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 20, at 213, 223.   
 172. See supra Section I.F.  
 173. See supra Section I.C. 
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provides insights into the level of shareholder protection the United States 
currently offers compared to other countries. Under the ADRI, which is 
governed solely by state corporate law, the U.S. scores poorly by global 
standards. In contrast, with the ASDI and the CBR SPI, both of which 
factor in federal securities regulation and stock market listing rules, the 
level of shareholder protection is high in global terms.  
1.  ADRI 
With the ADRI, as mentioned we draw upon the approaches DLLS 
and  Spamann developed.174 As shown in Table 4, DLLS gave the United 
States (i.e., Delaware) a “3” out of “6” overall, while Spamann gave 
Delaware an aggregate score of “2.” This discrepancy arises from the 
proxy voting element of the ADRI. DLLS gave Delaware a “1” for proxy 
voting175 because the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) 
explicitly authorizes voting by proxy.176 Spamann only gave countries a 
“1” with this variable if the law required that proxies provide for yes or 
no “two-way” voting.177 Delaware corporate law does not do this, so he 
scored this element “0.”  
Table 4: Delaware’s Present-Day ADRI Scores 
ADRI Element DLLS Spamann Justification for Present-Day 
Score  
Vote by Proxy 
Allowed 
1 0 DGCL § 212(b) gives shareholders 
the right to vote by proxy but does 
not provide, as Spamann requires, 
for two way voting.178 
No Block 1 1 “Under the default regime, firms 
cannot require deposit of 
shares . . . by stockholders 
exercising their right to vote.”179 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 174. See supra Sections I.C–I.E. 
 175. DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Revised Antidir tab, col. B).  
 176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (2015); see also DLLS, supra note 36, at 454 (indicating 
that it would suffice if “shareholders can vote by mail on each of the items on the agenda through 
a ballot or proxy form”). For the elements of DLLS’s revised ADRI, see id. at 455 tbl.9. 
 177. Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘Anti-
Director Rights Index’ Under Consistent Coding 27 (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for 
Law, Econ., & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper No. 7, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c 
fm?abstract_id=894301. “Yes or no” or “two-way” voting refers to a proxy form that explicitly 
gives shareholders the ability to instruct the proxy to vote for or against a resolution. Id. at 24. 
 178. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (2015). 
 179. Holger Spamann, Appendix to the ‘Anti-Director Rights Index’ Revisited, REV. FIN. 
STUD. 183 (2010), http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/suppl/2009/09/24/hhp067.DC1/hhp067_ 
suppl_data.pdf. 
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Cumulative 
Voting 
0 0 DGCL § 214 provides for an 
enabling rule, not a default rule.180 
Oppressed 
Minority 
1 1 Minority shareholders can enforce 
breaches of duty by directors with a 
derivative suit and can challenge 
shareholder amendments to the 
corporate charter on grounds of 
“unfairness.”181 
Preemptive 
Rights 
0 0 “Preemptive rights exist only to the 
extent expressly granted in the 
[certificate of incorporation].”182 
Ability to Call 
General Meeting 
0 0 “[S]hareholders can call a special 
meeting only if allowed by, and 
under the conditions specified in, 
the [certificate of 
incorporation].”183 
Total 3184 2185  
 
Given that in recent years Delaware law has not been amended in a 
way that would affect the scoring of any ADRI variables, DLLS’s and 
Spamann’s codings for U.S. corporate law should determine Delaware’s 
present-day score for this Article’s purposes. These codings imply that 
Delaware corporate law is not “shareholder friendly,” at least in 
comparison with other countries scored using the ADRI. DLLS’s U.S. 
score of “3” was substantially below the average score of 4.29 DLLS 
awarded to common law countries and was similar to the average for civil 
law countries (2.88).186 According to  Spamann’s coding, Delaware’s 
aggregate ADRI score of “2” trailed well behind the overall average for 
common law countries (4.06) and civil law countries (3.93).187 Indeed, 
no country had a lower overall score.188  
                                                                                                                     
 180. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214. 
 181. Spamann, supra note 179, at 184. 
 182. Id. (citation omitted) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(3)). 
 183. Id. (citation omitted) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d)). 
 184. DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Revised Antidir tab);  Spamann, supra note 40, at 475 
tbl.1. 
 185. Spamann, supra note 40, at 475 tbl.1. For an in-depth look at this data, see Spamann, 
supra note 123. 
 186. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 460 & tbl.13 (discussing the common law averages). DLLS 
did not specify the civil law average but was set out in Table XII of a working paper version. 
DLLS, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing 62 tbl.12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11883, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11883.pdf. In his 
2010 article, Spamann provided different averages for the DLLS ADRI, namely 4.22 for common 
law countries and 3.11 for civil law countries. Spamann, supra note 40, at 475 tbl.1. DLLS and 
Spamann provided aggregate data for civil law and common law countries because an important 
feature of the “law and finance” literature has been to determine whether legal protection relevant 
to investors differs among different legal families, such as civil or common law. 
 187. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 606, 608 tbl.2. 
 188. Spamann, supra note 40, at 475 tbl.1.  
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For both Illinois and the Model Act, using DLLS’s approach to the 
ADRI, “4” appears to be the appropriate present-day aggregate score (see 
tables 5 and 6). This aligns these jurisdictions more closely with the 
DLLS average for common law countries and means that they have 
significantly higher aggregate scores than the typical civil law country. 
The situation is somewhat different if Spamann’s methodology is used. 
Given that neither the Model Act nor Illinois mandate the use of two-way 
proxies, under Spamann’s methodology their aggregate present-day 
scores become “3” rather than “4” respectively. This is below the overall 
average for both common law countries and civil law countries, but the 
discrepancy is not as dramatic as with Delaware.  
Table 5: Illinois Present-Day ADRI Scores 
ADRI Element DLLS Spamann Justification for Present-
Day Score  
Vote by Proxy 
Allowed 
1 0 Illinois Business Corporation 
Act (IBCA) § 7.50; reasoning 
for scoring is the same as 
Delaware.189 
No Block 1 1 IBCA § 7.25 (provides for the 
concept of record ownership 
of shares, which means 
companies can identify who is 
entitled to vote without 
blocking share transfers prior 
to shareholder meetings).190  
Cumulative Voting 1 1 IBCA § 7.40 requires 
cumulative voting unless the 
articles of incorporation say 
otherwise.191  
Oppressed 
Minority 
1 1 Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 
230, 232–33 (Ill. 1988); 
Kalabogias v. Georgou, 254 
Ill. App. 3d 740, 747 (1993); 
IBCA §7.80 (governing the 
procedure for derivative 
litigation).  
Preemptive Rights 0 0 IBCA § 6.50, which merely 
permits preemptive rights to 
be created in the certificate of 
incorporation.192 
Ability to Call 
General Meeting 
0 0 IBCA § 7.05 (shareholders 
owning 20% of the shares can 
call a meeting, which exceeds 
                                                                                                                     
 189. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.50 (2015) (stating that “[a] shareholder may appoint a 
proxy to vote”). 
 190. Id. 5/7.25. 
 191. Id. 5/7.40. 
 192. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6.50. 
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10% maximum required for a 
“1”).”193  
Total 4 3  
Table 6: Model Act Present-Day ADRI Scores 
ADRI Element DLLS Spamann Justification for Present-
Day Score  
Vote by Proxy 
Allowed 
1 0 Model Act § 7.22; reasoning 
for scoring is the same as 
Delaware.194 
No Block 1 1 Spamann cites Model Act §§ 
6.27 and 7.07 to show blocking 
is permissible.195 
Cumulative Voting 0 0 Model Act § 7.28(b) 
(providing for an enabling rule, 
not a default rule).196 
Oppressed Minority 1 1 Spamann (2008, p. 184), citing 
Model Act §§ 8.31, 8.61, 
13.02, and Chapter 7 
Subchapter D.197 
Preemptive Rights 0 0 Model Act § 6.30; reasoning 
similar to that for Illinois; see 
also Spamann (2008, p. 
184).198 
Ability to Call 
General Meeting 
1 1 Model Act § 7.02(a) (10% 
threshold).199  
Total 4 3  
2.  ASDI 
Recall that the second index upon which we rely, the ASDI, measures 
the law applicable to a hypothetical self-dealing transaction by way of a 
public and private enforcement index.200 The ASDI private enforcement 
index is comprised of two sub-indices relating respectively to ex ante and 
ex post control.201 For the most part, each of these sub-indices’ present-
day scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act are identical. With 
                                                                                                                     
 193. Id. 5/7.05. 
 194. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 195. See Spamann, supra note 180, at 184 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 6.27, 
7.07). 
 196. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.28(b); Spamann, supra note 180, at 184 (“Preemptive 
rights exist only to the extent expressly granted in the [certificate of incorporation].” (citations 
omitted)). 
 197. See Spamann, supra note 180, at 184 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 8.31, 8.61, 
13.02). 
 198.  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.30. 
 199. Id. § 7.02(a). 
 200. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
 201. See supra text accompanying notes 93–95. 
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the Model Act, this is partly due to our drawing upon Delaware and 
Illinois scoring for one ASDI element where coding was problematic, as 
the Model Act is a model statute not anchored to the laws of a particular 
state.202  
The element we drew on from Delaware and Illinois law to code the 
ASDI for the Model Act involves a component of the ex post control of 
the anti-self-dealing index regarding “access to evidence.”203 With 
“access to evidence,” the possible overall score ranges from “0” to “1.”204 
A jurisdiction receives 0.25 each when a plaintiff-shareholder 
challenging the hypothetical transaction who owns at least ten percent of 
the shares can (i) request that a court investigate the self-dealing 
transaction; (ii) request “documents relevant to the case from the 
defendant”; (iii) ask the defendant questions prior to trial without prior 
judicial approval; and (iv) ask the same of non-parties without judicial 
approval.205 For U.S. companies, these issues are governed by civil 
procedure rules of the state where the litigation would occur rather than 
by corporate law itself.206 Given that DLLS awarded the United States 
(i.e., Delaware) a “0.75” for access to evidence207 and given that this in 
all likelihood is the appropriate score for Illinois,208 we have given the 
same score to the Model Act.  
Although ASDI scores are much the same for Delaware, the Model 
Act, and Illinois, the situation is different for disclosure requirements in 
the ex ante private control of self-dealing index applicable to Buyer Co. 
and Mr. James. DLLS awarded the United States (i.e., Delaware) “1” for 
these variables.209 They did not do so because an explicit statutory duty 
is imposed; there are no provisions mandating such disclosure in the 
DGCL.210 Instead, it appears that Delaware received “1”s for disclosure 
                                                                                                                     
 202. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., intro. xix (stating that “[t]he Model Act is designed as a 
free-standing general corporation statute”). 
 203. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 434 tbl.1. 
 204. Id.  
 205. Id.  
 206. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.  
 207. See DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Ex Post Control tab, col. H). 
 208. On Delaware, DLLS, Data, supra note 81, Ex Ante Control tab, columns D and E. 
Illinois should be given one-quarter point each because, under the hypothetical, the plaintiff 
shareholder could request documents, could ask the defendant questions prior to trial and could 
do the same with non-parties. See ILCS Supreme Court Rules, R. 206 (right to conduct oral 
depositions of parties and non-parties), R. 210 (right to conduct written depositions of parties and 
non-parties), R. 213 (right to conduct interrogatories), R. 214 (right to demand document 
production). The overall score should not be 1.00 because Illinois, like Delaware, lacks procedural 
or corporate law rules permitting a shareholder to request a court investigation.  
 209. DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Ex Ante Control tab, cols. D–E).  
 210. See Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1758–59 & n.127 (citing DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2014)). 
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by Buyer Co. and by Mr. James because the relevant disclosures would 
have to occur for the parties to the hypothetical transaction to be able to 
rely on a statutory “safe harbor” provision in Delaware’s corporate statute 
designed to help shield a related-party transaction from challenge and 
protect the directors involved from liability.211  
The Model Act’s related-party transaction “safe harbor” provision is 
worded similarly to Delaware’s,212 meaning the Model Act similarly 
should receive “1”s for the rules governing disclosure by the Buyer Co. 
and Mr. James. In contrast, Illinois’s “safe harbor” provision explicitly 
ensures that a transaction can be insulated from challenge if it was “fair” 
regardless of whether ex ante disclosure occurred. The relevant measure 
provides that the absence of full disclosure merely shifts the burden of 
proof on to those asserting that the related-party transaction should be 
treated as valid on the grounds of its fairness.213 Correspondingly, Illinois 
should receive a “0” both for rules governing disclosure by the Buyer Co. 
and by Mr. James. With Illinois scoring “0”s for other elements of the 
ASDI’s ex ante private control of self-dealing sub-index, Table 7 shows 
that Delaware and the Model Act necessarily have higher overall scores.  
Table 7: Present-Day ASDI Ex Ante Private Control of Self-Dealing 
Sub-index—Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act 
ASDI 
Element 
Delaware Illinois Model Act Justification 
for Present-
Day Score 
Disinterested 
Shareholder 
Approval 
0 0 0 None of the 
jurisdictions 
have rules in 
place requiring 
that 
shareholders 
vote on related-
party 
transactions. 
The United 
Kingdom is an 
example of a 
jurisdiction 
where such 
approval is 
required.214 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Id. at 1758–59.   
 212. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.61 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  
 213. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.60 (2015); see also Janice M. Church, Director Conflict of 
Interest Under the 1983 B.C.A.; A Standard of Fairness, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 750 (“Section 
8.60 supports such an approach because it relegates factors relevant to procedural fairness—
disclosure and approval—to the issue of shifting the burden of proof.”). 
 214. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 190–96 (UK). 
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Disclosure by 
Buyer Co. 
1 0 1 See discussion 
on disclosure 
above.215  
Disclosure by 
Mr. James 
1 0 1 See discussion 
of disclosure 
above.216  
Independent 
Review  
0 0 0 None of the 
jurisdictions 
require that an 
independent 
auditor or 
financial expert 
scrutinize a 
related-party 
transaction.217  
Ex Ante 
Disclosure  
0.67 0 0.67 Average of 
previous three 
variables.218 
Ex Ante 
Private 
Control of 
Self-Dealing  
0.33 0 0.33 Average of 
approval by 
disinterested 
shareholders 
and ex ante 
disclosure.219 
 
Compared with countries elsewhere the ex ante private control of self-
dealing scores for the regimes we focus on are mediocre at best. The 
Delaware and Model Act scores of 0.33 were below the average of 0.36 
for the seventy-two countries DLLS focused on.220 Only three of the 
countries—Austria, Hungary, and Tunisia—scored as poorly as Illinois 
with its 0.00.221  
With ex post private control of self-dealing, the story is much 
different. The overall Delaware, Illinois, and Model Act scores of 0.98 
(see Table 8) are inferior to only one jurisdiction—Singapore with 
1.00.222 Unlike with ex ante private control of self-dealing, the ex post 
sub-index elements did not vary between Delaware, Illinois, and the 
Model Act.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 215. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.   
 216. See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.   
 217. See Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1756 tbl.2. 
 218. See id.  
 219. See id.  
 220. Id. at 1756. 
 221. DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Ex Ante Control tab, col. H).  
 222. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1756. 
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Table 8: Present-Day ASDI Ex Post Private Control of Self-
Dealing Sub-index and Overall ASDI Scores—Delaware, Illinois, 
and the Model Act 
 
ASDI Element Delaware Illinois Model Act Justification 
for Present-
Day Score 
Disclosure 
in 
periodic 
filings 
1 1 1 Federal 
regulations.223 
Standing to Sue 
(equals 1 if a 
derivative suit can 
be brought against 
Mr. James and 
bodies approving 
the transaction) 
1 1 1 Discussion of 
derivative 
action in 
relation to the 
oppressed 
minority 
variable 
above.224 
Rescission (equals 
1 if rescission is 
available if the 
transaction is 
unfair or involves 
a conflict of 
interest) 
1 1 1 At common 
law, a related-
party 
transaction was 
void or at least 
voidable.225 
Delaware, 
Illinois, and the 
Model Act each 
have statutory 
safe harbor 
provisions that 
can shelter 
transactions 
from 
challenge.226 
However, these 
provisions 
would not 
operate if a 
transaction was 
unfair or had 
not been 
approved by the 
board or the 
shareholders. 
Ease of Holding 
Mr. James Liable 
(equals 1 if the 
interested director 
is liable if the 
1 1 1 The Model Act 
specifically 
recognizes that 
damages will 
be recoverable 
                                                                                                                     
 223. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.494, 240.14a-2, 240.15d-1 (2016). 
 224. See supra Tables 4–6. 
 225. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8, subch. F, intro. cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).  
 226. See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
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transaction is 
unfair, oppressive, 
or prejudicial) 
when a related-
party 
transaction 
cannot be saved 
under a 
statutory safe 
harbor.227 The 
remedy should 
also be 
available at 
common law.228 
Ease of Holding 
Approving Body 
Liable (equals 1 if 
the members of 
the approving 
body are liable if 
the transaction is 
unfair, oppressive, 
or prejudicial) 
1 1 1 Unclear. 
Relevant 
Delaware case 
law indicates 
that, in a 
related-party 
transaction 
context, 
directors who 
approve a one-
sided 
transaction will 
be held liable 
only if they 
have breached 
duties of 
loyalty and care 
(i.e., gross 
negligence).229 
Under DLLS’s 
coding scheme, 
this means the 
United States 
should have 
received “0.” 
However, 
consistent with 
our policy of 
deferring to 
original 
coding,230 all 
three 
jurisdictions are 
scored “1.” 
Access to 
Evidence 
0.75 0.75 0.75 See discussion 
on access to 
                                                                                                                     
 227. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.61(a). 
 228. See, e.g., Levin v. Levin, 405 A.2d 770, 779 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979). 
 229. See, e.g., In re Loral Space & Comm’ns, Inc., 2008 WL 4293781, at *33 (Del. Ch. 2008) 
(“[B]eing a non-independent director who approved a conflict transaction found unfair does not 
make one, without more, liable personally for harm caused. Rather, the court must examine that 
director’s behavior in order to assess whether the director breached her fiduciary duties . . . .”). 
 230. See supra Section I.C. 
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evidence 
above.231 
Ease of Proving 
Wrongdoing 
0.95 0.95 0.95 Average of 
previous five 
variables.232 
Ex Post Private 
Control of Self-
Dealing 
0.98 0.98 0.98 Average of 
disclosure and 
ease of private 
wrongdoing.233 
Anti-self-dealing 
Index (Private 
Enforcement) 
0.65 0.49 0.65 Average of ex 
ante private 
control of self-
dealing and ex 
post private 
control of self-
dealing.234 
 
As Table 8 indicates, with the ASDI the ex ante and ex post sub-
indices are averaged to produce an overall ASDI private enforcement 
score. For Delaware and the Model Act, the combination of the very high 
ex post private control of self-dealing score with the mediocre score of 
0.33 for ex ante private control yields an overall present-day score of 
0.65. This placed Delaware (i.e., the United States) tenth highest among 
the seventy-two countries DLLS coded and well above the global average 
of 0.44.235 Illinois’s overall private control of self-dealing score of 0.49—
despite being driven downwards by the score of 0 with ex ante private 
control—would have still placed Illinois twenty-fourth out of the 
seventy-two countries.236 
3.  CBR SPI 
With the CBR SPI, the third and final index we consider, when Siems 
and his CBR co-authors scored the United States (again, meaning 
Delaware) for 2005, they gave it a score of 7.25 out of 10.237 When they 
updated the CBR SPI in 2013, the score for the United States increased 
to 7.5, because the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 introduced an advisory say-
on-pay vote for executive pay.238 There have been no relevant changes to 
the law since. Given our methodological choice not to depart from scores 
                                                                                                                     
 231. See supra notes 203–08 and accompanying text. 
 232. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1757 tbl.3. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See id.  
 235. Id. at 1756, 1757 tbl.3. 
 236. See DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Ex Post Control tab, col. K).  
 237. See Armour et al., supra note 49, at 357 tbl.2, 359. 
 238. MATHIAS SIEMS ET AL., CBR EXTENDED SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INDEX 106 (2d ed. 
2013). 
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generated by those initially constructing an index we use, Delaware’s 
present-day score correspondingly is 7.5, as shown in Table 9 below.  
Table 9: Delaware Present-Day CBR SPI Scores 
CBR SPI Element Delaware 
Score (2013–
present day) 
Justification for Present-Day 
Score239 
Powers of the General Meeting 
for de facto changes (the level 
of shareholder approval 
required for a sale of the 
company’s assets governs the 
score)  
0.75 DGCL § 271 requires shareholder 
approval for the sale, lease, or 
exchange of “substantially all” of the 
assets.240 The relevant case law 
indicates that fifty percent does not 
automatically constitute 
“substantially all,” which was the 
threshold specified for awarding a 
“1.”241  
Agenda Setting Power (the 
score is based on the ability of 
shareholders owning specified 
percentages of shares to put a 
matter to a shareholder vote)  
1 SEC Rule 14a-7 (requiring a public 
company to provide a shareholder list 
to shareholders who ask).242 SEC 
Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders 
meeting modest share ownership 
requirements to circulate resolutions 
in proxy material their company 
circulates.243  
Anticipation of Shareholder 
Decision Facilitated (equals 0.5 
if postal voting is possible; 1 if 
postal voting is possible and 
companies soliciting proxies 
must use “two-way”—“yes” 
and “no”—proxy forms) 
1 NYSE Manual, § 402.04 (requiring 
listed companies to solicit proxies to 
facilitate shareholder voting);244  
SEC Rule 14a-4(b)(1) (mandating 
use of two way proxies).245 
Prohibition of Multiple Voting 
Rights  
0.5 NYSE Manual § 313.00 states that 
voting rights cannot be disparately 
reduced or restricted but that 
companies with non-voting shares 
are permitted to continue to list and 
issue such shares.246 
Independent Board Members 
(equals 1 if at least half of the 
board members must be 
1 NYSE Manual § 303A.01 states that 
half of the board members must be 
independent.247  
                                                                                                                     
 239. Id. at 105–07; SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 103–05. 
 240. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2015). 
 241. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 103. 
 242. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–7 (2016). 
 243. Id. § 240.14a–8. 
 244. N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED CO. MANUAL § 402.04 (2013) [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL]. 
 245. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4.  
 246. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 244, § 313.00. 
 247. Id.  § 303A.01. 
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independent; 0.5 if twenty-five 
percent of them must be 
independent) 
Feasibility of Director’s 
Dismissal (equals 0.75 if a 
dismissed director can only 
claim for contractual 
compensation if dismissed 
without good reason if 
compensation is specifically 
contractually agreed)  
0.75 There can be compensation 
agreements with dismissed directors 
(DGCL § 141(k)),248 and 
shareholders, by virtue of the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010,249 have the right 
to an advisory “say-on-pay” vote.250  
Private Enforcement of Director 
Duties (score is based on the 
ease with which a minority 
shareholder can bring a 
derivative suit) 
0.75 Siems–CBR acknowledged that 
derivative actions are feasible in the 
United States but did not award a “1” 
because various restrictions apply, 
such as a contemporaneous 
ownership requirement (the plaintiff 
must have owned shares at the time 
the alleged breach of duty occurred), 
a requirement that a plaintiff 
typically make “demand” (ask the 
board to sue), and judicial deference 
to screening by special litigation 
committees.251 
Shareholder Action Against 
Resolutions of the General 
Meeting (equals 1 if every 
shareholder is eligible to 
challenge a shareholder 
resolution) 
1 Siems–CBR relied upon Delaware 
case law to justify awarding “1.”252 
The cases cited indicate that the 
powers of the majority are “always 
subject to the historical processes of 
a court of equity to gauge whether 
                                                                                                                     
 248. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2015). 
 249. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 250. Those constructing the CBR SPI apparently inaccurately conflated dismissal as a 
director with dismissal as an executive. The analysis of the “0.75” scoring for the United States 
cited MBCA § 8.08(a), which specifically permits a corporation’s shareholders to dismiss a 
director without cause, meaning the dismissed director will not be entitled to compensation, as 
well as the provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that provided for an advisory “say on pay” vote.  
SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 106. Despite section 8.08(a), an individual who is an executive, 
in addition to being a director, who is fired as an executive without cause, will be able to sue for 
damages for wrongful termination from the executive position. It seems this possibility was 
sufficient for Professor Siems and the CBR team to refrain from giving the United States (i.e., 
Delaware) a score of “1,” even though this scenario has nothing directly to do with director 
dismissal. Citing of the “say on pay” rule introduced by Dodd-Frank is also confusing in that the 
ability of shareholders to vote on executive compensation policy on an advisory basis has no 
obvious connection with the feasibility of director dismissal.   
 251. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 105–07; SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 105. 
 252. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 105–07; SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 105. 
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there has been an oppressive exercise 
of the power granted.”253 
Mandatory Bid (score is 
determined by the presence of 
rules requiring a shareholder 
who buys a designated 
percentage of shares to make an 
offer to buy the shares of all 
remaining shareholders)  
0 Neither Delaware nor federal law 
requires an investor who acquires a 
large stake in a company to make a 
bid for all of the shares of the 
company.254  
Disclosure of Major 
Shareholder Ownership (equals 
0.75 if shareholders who 
acquire at least five percent of a 
company’s shares have to 
disclose their stake) 
0.75 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
§ 13(d) and Schedule 13D of the Act 
combine to require those acquiring a 
stake of five percent or more to 
disclose their interest.255 
Total 7.5  
 
In comparative terms, shareholders in Delaware corporations are well-
protected. Among the twenty countries in the Siems–CBR dataset for 
2005, the United States, with its score of 7.25, tied for second best with 
France, trailing slightly behind the United Kingdom at 7.375 and 
substantially exceeding the average score of 5.2.256 Due to improved 
shareholder protection elsewhere,  the United States’ aggregate score of 
7.5 for 2013 did not rank quite as highly as its 2005 score.257 Three 
countries—China, Russia and France—each had scores exceeding the 
U.S. aggregate, and the United Kingdom, Japan, and Slovenia all had 
equivalent overall scores.258  
While under the ADRI, the Illinois and Model Act present-day 
aggregate scores diverge from Delaware’s,259 and the same occurs with 
Illinois and the ASDI, with the CBR SPI260 as Table 10 indicates, all three 
sources of law have present-day scores which are identical element-by-
element. The fact that federal law (including stock exchange listing rules) 
determined the relevant score with five variables and influenced the 
scoring for a sixth contributed substantially to this uniformity.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 253. Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 202 (D. Del. 1943), aff’d 146 F.2d 
701 (3d Cir. 1944).  
 254. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 105–07; SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 105. 
 255. Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Item 5(d)–(e). 
 256. See Armour et al., supra note 49, at 357 tbl.2 (calculating the average from figures 
provided in Table 2).   
 257. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 105–07. 
 258. Katelouzou & Siems, supra note 101, at 133–34 & fig.1.  
 259. See supra Tables 3–4.  
 260. See supra Tables 7–8.  
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Table 10: Illinois and Model Act Present-Day CBR SPI Scores 
CBR SPI Element Illinois/Model 
Act Scores 
(2013–present 
day) 
Justification for Present-Day 
Score 
Powers of the General Meeting 
for de facto changes  
0.75/0.75 IBCA § 11.60 has the same 
standard as Delaware.261  
Model Act § 12.02(a) in effect 
requires a shareholder vote if less 
than twenty-five percent of assets 
will remain after a disposition.262 
Agenda Setting Power 1/1 Federal securities law.263 
Anticipation of Shareholder 
Decision Facilitated 
1/1 NYSE listing rules and federal 
securities law.264 
Prohibition of Multiple Voting 
Rights 
0.5/0.5 NYSE listing rules.265 
Independent Board Members 1/1 NYSE listing rules.266  
Feasibility of Director’s 
Dismissal 
0.75/0.75 IBCA § 8.35 and Model Act 
§ 8.08 both permit shareholders to 
dismiss directors without cause, 
but executives dismissed without 
cause can still sue for 
compensation.267 The Dodd-Frank 
provisions concerning “say on 
pay” amend federal securities 
law.268  
Private Enforcement of Director 
Duties 
0.75/0.75 As is the case with Delaware,269 
derivative actions are feasible 
under the IBCA and the Model 
Act but  with similar limitations in 
place,  a “1” is not justified.270 
                                                                                                                     
 261. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.60 (2015). 
 262. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 12.02(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 263. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a–7, 240.14a–8 (2016). 
 264. Id. § 240.14a-4; NYSE MANUAL, supra note 244, § 402.04. 
 265. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 244, § 313.00. 
 266. Id. § 303A.01. 
 267. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.35 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.08(a). 
 268. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.  
 269. See supra Table 9. 
 270. On the necessity of demand, see 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.80(b); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT ANN. § 7.24(1). On special litigation committees, see Weiland v. Ill. Power Co., 1990 WL 
267364 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (accepting the use of a special litigation committee); MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT ANN. §§ 1.43, 7.44 (indicating that “qualified” directors lacking a material interest in the 
challenged transaction can dismiss a derivative suit). On contemporaneous ownership, see 805 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.80(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.41(1). 
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Shareholder Action Against 
Resolutions of the General 
Meeting  
1/1 Cases cited to justify a “1” for 
Delaware are consistent with 
general common law trends.271 
Mandatory Bid  0/0 The position is the same under 
Illinois law and the Model Act as 
it is for Delaware.272  
Disclosure of Major 
Shareholder Ownership  
0.75/0.75 Federal securities law.273  
Total 7.5/7.5  
C.  Historical Trends 
This Section turns from the present day to historical trends.  The 
scoring for Delaware and Illinois for the ADRI, ASDI, and the CBR SPI 
extends back to 1899. The start date for the Model Act is 1950 because it 
was promulgated then.    
1.  ADRI 
With four of the six ADRI variables it appears that the scores 
remained unchanged going back through time—to 1899 in the case of 
Delaware and Illinois and to 1950 for the Model Act. First, with voting 
by proxy, just as is the case today, Delaware and Illinois corporate 
legislation authorized shareholders to vote in this manner in 1899 without 
requiring the proxy documentation to provide for “two-way” voting.274 
The Model Act has done likewise since 1950.275  
Second, our searches failed to reveal any historical evidence of 
provisions in Delaware, Illinois, or the Model Act designed to block the 
transfer of shares prior to shareholder meetings.276 Third, regarding the 
oppressed minority variable, although Delaware courts did not 
specifically confirm shareholders’ right to file derivative suits against 
directors until the early 1920s,277 it was clearly available in Illinois as the 
                                                                                                                     
 271. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the Post-
Contractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 573 & n.63 (1996) (treating the cases cited as 
authoritative jurisprudence concerning recapitalizations involving preferred shareholders).   
 272. See supra Table 9. 
 273. Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Item 5(d)–(e) (2016). 
 274. An Act Providing a General Corporation Law, ch. 273, § 20, 21 Del. Laws (1899) 
(current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2015)); 32 ILL. REV. STAT. § 3 (1874) (codified 
as amended at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.50). 
 275. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 31 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1950).  
 276. At various points in time, there were statutory provisions that gave a corporation’s 
directors the power to close the stock transfer books prior to a shareholder meeting to fix who 
could vote. See, e.g., DEL. REV. CODE ch. 65, § 17 (1925); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 28. These 
measures, however, did not authorize the directors to preclude dealing in the shares. 
 277. Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A. 411, 414 (Del. Ch. 1924); Allied Chem. & Dye 
Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of Am., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1923).  
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19th century drew to a close.278 More generally, the derivative suit was 
available in the United States at least as early as 1831279 and was widely 
understood to be a general feature of U.S. corporate law by the late-19th 
century.280 Correspondingly, “1” is the appropriate score for Delaware 
and Illinois from the present day back to 1899 and for the Model Act back 
to 1950.  
Finally, regarding a shareholder’s right to call a shareholder meeting, 
Delaware did not statutorily regulate this topic until 1967 and has never 
specifically authorized shareholders owning a designated percentage of 
shares to call a meeting.281 While Illinois has empowered shareholders to 
call shareholder meetings since 1872 and the ownership threshold was 
reduced from two-thirds to twenty percent in 1933, the relevant figure has 
always exceeded the ten-percent threshold required to receive a “1” under 
the ADRI.282 The Model Act, in contrast, has since 1950 authorized 
shareholders owning ten percent or more of a corporation’s shares to call 
a meeting, thus meriting a “1.”283  
Cumulative voting and preemptive rights are the two ADRI variables 
where change has occurred, moving from “1” to “0” in each case. For 
cumulative voting, the Model Act is the only legal regime affected, with 
the score falling from “1” to “0” in 1969.284 Delaware specifically 
authorized companies to “opt in” to this method of director selection in 
1917 but never established cumulative voting as a default rule, meaning 
its cumulative voting score has remained “0” from 1899 to the present 
day.285 While Illinois displaced a long-standing mandatory cumulative 
                                                                                                                     
 278. Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 32 N.E. 420, 422–23 (Ill. 1892); City of Chi. v. 
Cameron, 11 N.E. 899, 902–03 (Ill. 1887).  
 279. See Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162, 165–69 (1831). In Dodge v. Woolsey, 
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the derivative suit. 59 U.S. 331, 342 (1855). Dodge 
subsequently became the leading case on derivative litigation.  Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra 
note 27, at 1749 n.68; Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum 
Corporation to the Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1048 (2015).  
 280. See, e.g., 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 
§ 242 (2d ed. 1886).  
 281. An Act to Amend Chapter 1 of Title 8 of the Delaware Code, ch. 50, § 211(d), 56 Del. 
Laws (1967) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. § 211(d) (2015)); Cheffins, Bank & Wells, 
supra note 33 at 609 tbl.3.   
 282. See 32 ILL. REV. STAT. § 22 (1918) (current version at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.05 
(2015)) (requiring a two-third minimum of stockholders to call a meeting); Henry Winthrop 
Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 386 
(1934) (noting that “[h]olders of not less than one-fifth of the outstanding shares may demand the 
calling of a meeting”). 
 283. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 26 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1950). 
 284. On the chronology, see Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1750–51.  
 285. See An Act to Amend Chapter 65 of the Revised Code of Delaware, ch. 113, § 9, 29 
Del. Laws (1917); Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 609 tbl.3.  
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voting rule in favor of a presumptive rule in 1984,286 “1” remains the 
appropriate score throughout because default rules are taken into account 
when scoring with the ADRI.  
All three jurisdictions experienced a change regarding preemptive 
rights, with the score dropping from “1” to “0” in each instance. At 
common law, shareholders had preemptive rights,287 meaning that as of 
1899 Delaware and Illinois both scored “1” for this variable, and the 
Model Act did likewise as of its inception in 1950. The inaugural version 
of the Model Act expressly permitted shareholders to waive their 
preemptive rights,288 as Delaware and Illinois had done since 1927 and 
1933 respectively.289 These enabling measures were insufficient to 
change a score of “1” to “0.” This occurred with Delaware, Illinois, and 
the Model Act in 1967, 1982, and 1984 respectively when they each 
eliminated preemptive rights unless the articles of incorporation provided 
otherwise.290  
Since all changes affecting the ADRI over time were from “1” to “0,” 
the ADRI scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act inevitably 
trended downward. Moreover, with changes only affecting two of the 
ADRI variables, it was likely that changes to aggregate scores would be 
modest. This indeed was the case with Delaware, where the only change 
was from “4” to “3” (“3” to “2” using Spamann’s methodology) due to 
the 1967 displacement of preemptive rights, as shown in Table 11. 
Likewise, Illinois’s aggregate score fell from “5” to “4” (“4” to “3” using 
Spamann’s methodology) in 1982 due to the same change. These findings 
lend support to conjectures that meaningful competition between states 
in the corporate law realm “has long since ended”291 and amounts not to 
a race but a “leisurely walk.”292  
                                                                                                                     
 286. Compare 32 ILL. REV. STAT. § 3 (1874), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.40 (1983) 
(amended 1995). For a discussion of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 and its coming 
into force in 1984, see James M. Van Vliet, Jr., The New Illinois Business Corporation Act Needs 
More Work, 61 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1985). 
 287. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 133 (1932); Wells, supra note 66, at 610–11. 
 288. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 24. 
 289. An Act Proposing an Amendment to Article 2 of the Constitution of the State of 
Delaware, ch. 85, § 5 para. 10, 35 Del. Laws (1927); ILL. BUS. CORP. ACT § 24 (1934).   
 290. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 102(b)(3) (1967); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6.50 (2015) (effective 
July 1, 1984); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.30(a), at 6-198 to 6-200 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) 
(indicating as well that a provision was added to the Model Act in 1955 providing for abolition of 
preemptive rights that was set out as an alternative to the 1950 “opt out” approach).  
 291. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 679, 724 (2002).  
 292. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 586.   
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Table 11: Aggregate ADRI Scores—Delaware, Illinois, and Model 
Act, 1899–Present293 
 1899 1950 1967 1969 1982 1984 Present 
day 
Delaware 
(DLLS–
Spamann) 
4/3 4/3 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 3/2 
Illinois 
(DLLS–
Spamann) 
5/4 5/4 5/4 5/4 4/3 4/3 4/3 
Model Act 
(DLLS–
Spamann) 
X 6/5 6/5 5/4 5/4 4/3 4/3 
 
Under the Model Act, because of the 1984 displacement of 
preemptive rights and the 1969 side-lining of cumulative voting, the 
downward trend was more pronounced. However, the drop occurred from 
a very high starting point. The Model Act’s ADRI aggregate score of “6” 
for 1950 to 1969, following DLLS’s coding, exceeded the score of every 
country DLLS considered when revising the ADRI.294 With Spamann’s 
recoding, only South Korea and Spain, with scores of “6,” exceeded the 
Model Act’s 1950 to 1969 score of “5.”295  
2.  ASDI  
With Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act there has been little 
change over time under the ASDI private control of self-dealing sub-
index. The mandating of shareholder approval and independent review of 
related-party transactions, both of which are facets of the ex ante sub-
index, have never been features of state corporate law in the United 
States. Correspondingly, for these variables a score a “0” is appropriate 
going back through time.  
                                                                                                                     
 293. Scoring changes are identified in bold.  
 294. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 432. 
 295. Spamann, supra note 40, at 475.  
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Table 12: ASDI Ex Ante Private Control of Self-Dealing—
Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act, 1899–Present296 
ASDI Element 1899—
Delaware/ 
Illinois/ 
Model Act 
1950—
Delaware/ 
Illinois/ 
Model Act 
1984—
Delaware/Illinois/
Model Act 
Present day—
Delaware/Illinois/
Model Act297 
Approval by 
Disinterested 
Shareholders 
0/0/x 0/0/0 0/0/0 0/0/0 
Disclosure by 
Buyer Co. 
1/1/x 1/1/1 1/0298/1 1/0/1 
Disclosure by 
Mr. James 
1/1/x 1/1/1 1/0/1 1/0/1 
Independent 
Review  
0/0/x 0/0/0 0/0/0 0/0/0 
Ex Ante 
Disclosure  
0.67/0.67/x 0.67/0.67/0
.67 
0.67/0/0.67 0.67/0/0.67 
Ex Ante Private 
Control of Self-
Dealing  
0.33/0.33/x 0.33/0.33/0
.33 
0.33/0/0.33 0.33/0/0.33 
 
Change did occur with respect to required disclosure by Mr. James 
and Buyer Co. Although Delaware and the Model Act remained 
unaffected, in Illinois the “safe harbor” provision ensuring that ex ante 
disclosure was not even implicitly required only took effect in 1984 when 
the IBCA came into force.299 Prior to this, the common law likely would 
have required full disclosure before a court could exercise its discretion 
to relieve parties of the adverse consequences potentially associated with 
related-party transactions.300 Hence, the only change to the ex ante private 
                                                                                                                     
 296. Scoring changes are identified in bold.  
 297. See supra Table 7.  
 298. Illinois initially had a statutory provision specifically governing related-party 
transactions in 1981. ILL. BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 40a (1933). The enactment of this provision would 
not have reduced Illinois’s disclosure by Buyer Co. and disclosure by Mr. James scores in the 
same way as the 1983 IBCA because the 1981 provision specifically required disclosure of the 
transaction to the board before a court could save the transaction. On the nature of the 1981 
provision, see Church, supra note 213, at 746–47.  
 299. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.60 (1983) (amended 1998).  On the IBCA coming into force 
in 1984, see supra note 286.    
 300. See Note & Comment, Corporations—Directors—Transactions Involving Conflicts of 
Interest, 42 ORE. L. REV. 61, 64 (1962) (“A finding of nondisclosure will make a consideration of 
other facets of a transaction unnecessary in most cases. Nondisclosure of an interest by a director 
may constitute unfairness per se under the fairness test and thus make the transaction voidable.” 
(footnote omitted)); Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors, 
61 HARV. L. REV. 335, 338 (1948) (“The courts usually require of the interested director full 
disclosure of his interest and of those facts, such as his own purchase price, which would affect 
the board’s decision to buy.”). With respect to Illinois, before 1984 there was conflicting case law 
concerning related-party transactions, but in Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp., full 
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control of self-dealing sub-index going back to 1899 was that Illinois’s 
ex ante disclosure score fell from 0.67 to 0 in 1984, which in turn reduced 
Illinois’s overall ex ante private control of self-dealing index score from 
0.33 to 0.  
As with the ex ante private control of self-dealing sub-index, the 
scoring under the ex post sub-index only changed for one variable going 
back through time, though that change was not restricted to only one 
jurisdiction. The variable affected was “disclosure in public filings,” with 
the relevant change occurring in 1935 when disclosure of material 
contracts between a company and any of its directors or officers became 
compulsory under federal securities law.301 The change more than 
doubled Delaware and Illinois’s ex post private control of self-dealing 
score and increased the overall anti-self-dealing sub-index score for both 
jurisdictions from 0.41 to 0.65 . 
Table 13: ASDI Ex Post Private Control of Self-Dealing—Delaware, 
Illinois, and the Model Act, 1899–Present302 
ASDI 
Element 
1899—
Delaware/Ill
inois/ 
Model Act 
1935—
Delaware/ 
Illinois/ 
Model Act 
1950—
Delaware/ 
Illinois/ 
Model Act 
1984—
Delaware/ 
Illinois/ 
Model Act 
Present 
Day—
Delaware/ 
Illinois/ 
Model Act303 
Disclosure in 
Periodic Filings 
0/0/x 1/1/x 1/1/1 1/1/1 1/1/1 
Standing to Sue  1/1/x 1/1/x 1/1/1 1/1/1 1/1/1 
Rescission  1/1/x 1/1/x 1/1/1 1/1/1 1/1/1 
Ease of Holding 
Mr. James 
Liable 
1/1/x 1/1/x 1/1/1 1/1/1 1/1/1 
Ease of Holding 
Approving 
Body Liable 
1/1/x 1/1/x 1/1/1 1/1/1 1/1/1 
Access to 
Evidence 
0.75/0.75/x 0.75/0.75/x 0.75/0.75/0.75 0.75/0.75/0.75 0.75/0.75/0.75 
Ease of Proving 
Wrongdoing 
0.95/0.95/x 0.95/0.95/x 0.95/0.95/0.95 0.95/0.95/0.95 0.95/0.95/0.95 
 
 
 
Ex Post Private 
Control of Self-
dealing 
0.48/0.48/x 0.98/0.98/x 0.98/0.98/0.98 0.98/0.98/0.98 0.98/0.98/0.98 
Anti-self-
dealing Index 
0.41/0.41/x 0.65/0.65/x 0.65/0.65/0.65 0.65/0.49/0.65 0.65/0.49/0.65 
                                                                                                                     
disclosure was identified as a factor that would determine the outcome of a fairness test. 66 N.E.2d 
793, 802 (Ill. 1960); Church, supra note 213, at 746, 749–50.  
 301. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1759. 
 302. Scoring changes are identified in bold.  
 303. See supra Table 8.  
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For other variables in the ASDI ex post private control of self-dealing 
sub-index, scores for “access to evidence” have remained unchanged over 
time because Delaware and Illinois civil procedure rules as far back as 
1899 provided for the same core litigant rights that justify the present-day 
score of “0.75.”304 For the variables measuring standing to sue, rescission, 
and the ease of holding Mr. James and the approving body (i.e., the board) 
liable, current common law principles provide the justification for the 
“1”s awarded to Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act.305 The same 
common law principles should have been applicable back to 1899. 
Verifying this point definitively is admittedly not feasible. For instance, 
Delaware lacked any case law directly focusing on related-party 
transactions until the early 1920s.306 Still, the trend of authority from 
other states should, in the absence of Delaware jurisprudence, provide a 
reasonably accurate characterization of what the law would have been in 
Delaware prior to that point.307  
3.  CBR SPI  
With both the ADRI and the ASDI there were relatively few changes 
to scores over time and, other than the 1935 introduction of the 
requirement of ex post disclosure of related party transactions, what 
changes there were all moved scores downwards. The situation was much 
different with the CBR SPI. For the CBR SPI, as Figure 1 shows, the 
aggregate score changed reasonably often and there was a marked upward 
trend of aggregate scores. There were changes at the state level as far 
back as 1903, with the pace of change increasing starting in 1950. As 
Table 14 shows, each change at the state level, with two exceptions, 
moved scores upward. Likewise, Table 15 shows that this trend was 
                                                                                                                     
 304. On the right to request documents relevant to the case from the defendant, see DEL. 
REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 13 (1893); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 9 (1874). On the right to examine the 
defendant without a court approving the questions, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 1, 24–28 (setting 
out rules for witnesses and indicating that parties were not excluded from being witnesses). On 
the right to examine non-parties without a court approving the questions, see id. §§ 24–28 (1874); 
DEL. CH. R. 40, 48 (1868) (allowing courts to enter an order of attachment against witnesses who 
fail to testify after being duly summoned). 
 305. See supra Table 8.  
 306. See Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1762. 
 307. There was pre-1920s case law from New York indicating that individual shareholders 
might lack standing to challenge related-party transactions. See id. at 1761–62. Even if this was 
in fact the law, the doctrine was subject to sufficiently wide exceptions to suggest a “1” was the 
appropriate score for standing to sue. See id. 
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strongly reinforced by changes in federal securities law and NYSE listing 
rules, which the SEC strongly influences.308  
 
Figure 1: CBR SPI Aggregate Scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the 
Model Act, 1899–Present 
 
Table 14: Changes to CBR SPI Scores for Individual Variables 
Generated by State Law—Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act, 
1899–Present 
 
Year CBR SPI 
Variable 
Jurisdiction(s) 
Affected 
Score 
Change 
Explanation 
1903 Prohibition 
of Multiple 
Voting 
Rights 
Delaware 1 to 0 The DGCL of 1899 authorized 
the issuance of share classes 
with different voting rights, but 
it only took full effect with the 
1903 repeal of a provision in 
the Delaware Constitution of 
1897 which stated that “in all 
elections for directors or 
managers of stock corporations, 
each shareholder shall be 
entitled to one vote for each 
share of stock he may hold.”309  
1950 X Model Act X Model Act first introduced.  
                                                                                                                     
 308. Roe, supra note 19, at 11.  
 309. Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 79 A. 790, 800 (Del. 1911) (quoting DEL. CONST. OF 
1897, art. 9, § 6). 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
8
9
9
1
9
0
3
1
9
3
8
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
2
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
6
9
1
9
7
0
1
9
8
4
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
5
Delaware
Illinois
MBCA (1950 onwards)
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1969 Feasibility of 
Director’s 
Dismissal 
Model Act 0 to 0.5 In 1960, the forerunner to the 
current Model Act § 8.08 was 
introduced as an “optional” 
provision, and in 1969 the 
optional designation was 
removed.310 This displaced the 
common law rule, which held 
that shareholders could only 
remove directors for cause, 
reflecting the fact that the 
directors had a statutory 
entitlement to their office.311 
The common law rule would 
score a “0” under the CBR SPI 
coding protocol.312 
1970 Feasibility of 
Director’s 
Dismissal 
Delaware 0.25 to 
0.5 
DGCL § 141(k) enacted,313 
which the CBR SPI coders 
relied upon to give Delaware 
(the U.S.) a “0.5.”314 
1982 Prohibition 
of Multiple 
Voting 
Rights 
Illinois 1 to 0.5 IBCA § 28 amended to allow 
corporations formed after 
December 31, 1981 to 
eliminate voting rights attached 
to shares, including those 
relating to cumulative 
voting.315 
1984 Feasibility of 
Director’s 
Dismissal 
Illinois 0 to 0.5 IBCA § 8.35 came into force, 
displacing the common law 
rules that offered shareholders 
little, if any, scope to dismiss 
directors.316 
                                                                                                                     
 310. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.08(a), at 8-82 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 311. Id. at 8-81; 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 9:14, at 86, 91. 
 312. Under the “[f]easibility of director’s dismissal,” the CBR coders gave jurisdictions a 
“0” if “good reason [was] required for the dismissal of directors.” Armour et al., supra note 49, 
at 354 tbl.1.  
 313. An Act to Amend Chapter 1, Title 8, Delaware Code, ch. 437, § 5, 59 Del. Laws (1974) 
(codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2015)). 
 314. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 103–04 tbl.25. Prior to the enactment of Section 141(k), 
the Delaware General Corporation Law contained a provision indicating that directors could be 
removed, but it was unclear whether this had to be for cause. See Charles H. Nida, Note, The New 
Delaware Corporation Law, 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 413, 427 (1968). Delaware had a provision of this 
sort going back to 1899. See Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A Cross-
Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791, 815 (2002). A pre-1970 score of “0.25” 
appears to be appropriate, which the CBR SPI coders award when it is clear that a director can be 
dismissed but would always be compensated. Armour et al., supra note 49, at 354 tbl.1.   
 315. See Roanoke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar, 461 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (Ill. 1984). 
 316. See, e.g., Van Vliet, supra note 286, at 34 (“New BCA section 8.35 reflects a basic 
public policy change, granting statutory authority for the removal of directors, with or without 
cause, by shareholder action. There was no counterpart to this in the Old BCA so that, prior to the 
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2003 Private 
Enforcement 
of Director 
Duties  
Delaware, 
Illinois, Model 
Act317 
0.5 to 
0.75 
The private enforcement of 
directors’ duties score 
increased due to case law 
developments “evidenc[ing] a 
heightening of judicial scrutiny 
on directors in the wake of the 
corporate governance 
scandals.”318 
 
Table 15: Changes to CBR SPI Scores for Individual Variables 
Generated by Changes to Federal Law—Delaware, Illinois, and the 
Model Act, 1899–Present 
 
Year CBR SPI 
Variable 
Jurisdiction(s) 
Affected 
Score 
Change 
Explanation 
1938 Anticipation of 
Shareholder 
Decision 
Facilitated 
Delaware, Illinois 0.5 to 1 SEC Rule X-14A-
2, forerunner to 
SEC Rule 14a-
4(b)(1), adopted.319 
                                                                                                                     
New BCA, only the common law right to remove a director for cause existed.”). The common 
law rule generally applicable in U.S. states was that directors could only be removed before the 
end of their terms “for cause,” but statute gradually replaced this rule beginning in the 1930s. See 
HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 433–34 (rev. ed. 1946). The law 
may have remained restrictive in Illinois because, prior to the adoption of the 1983 Illinois 
Business Corporation Act, “there was no statutory provision governing the removal of corporate 
directors.” Voss Eng’g, Inc. v. Voss Indus., 481 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). At least one 
Illinois court had earlier suggested that allowing shareholders to remove a director even for cause 
would be inappropriate because this would permit an end-run around cumulative voting 
requirements of the Illinois constitution. See Laughlin v. Geer, 121 Ill. App. 534, 538–39 (1905); 
7 CHARLES W. MURDOCK, ILLINOIS PRACTICE SERIES: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 11.18 (2d ed. 
2015).  
 317. With this case law-driven change in scoring, each case cited was from Delaware. SIEMS 
ET AL., supra note 111, at 105 tbl.25. However, given our policy of deferring to coding by those 
who constructed the original indices and given the influential nature of Delaware case law, we 
have assumed that the private enforcement of director duties score would increase with Illinois 
and the Model Act as well as with Delaware.   
 318. Id. (quoting Jeffrey D. Hern, Comment, Delaware Courts’ Delicate Response to the 
Corporate Governance Scandals of 2001 and 2002: Heightening Judicial Scrutiny on Directors 
of Corporations, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 207, 228 (2005)). 
 319. For a chronology of the SEC rules, see Sheldon E. Bernstein & Henry G. Fischer, The 
Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 226, 229 (1940). On the pre-1938 scoring, according to the CBR SPI protocol, a “0.5” is 
justified if postal or proxy voting is merely authorized. Armour et al., supra note 49, at 354 tbl.1. 
State laws that justify a coding of “1” for Delaware and Illinois for the ADRI proxy voting variable 
date back to 1899 should meet this threshold. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. The 
CBR SPI coders cite a NYSE listing rule compelling companies to solicit proxies to justify the 
“1” they give the United States with the “[a]nticipation of shareholder decision facilitated.” See 
supra Table 9. The relevant NYSE listing rule was not introduced until 1959. Douglas C. Michael, 
Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 
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1940 Prohibition of 
Multiple Voting 
Rights 
Delaware320 0 to 0.5 The NYSE 
introduced a rule 
precluding the 
listing of non-
voting common 
stock.321 
1942 Agenda Setting 
Power 
Delaware, Illinois 0 to 1 Shareholder 
proposal 
mechanism that is 
now SEC Rule 
14A-8 introduced 
as rule X-14A-7.322 
1956 Independent 
Board Members  
Delaware, Illinois, 
Model Act 
0 to 0.25 Companies listed 
on the NYSE 
required to have at 
least two 
independent 
directors.323  
1968 Disclosure of 
Major 
Shareholder 
Ownership  
Delaware, Illinois, 
Model Act 
0 to 0.5 The Williams Act 
introduced 
Securities 
Exchange Act of 
1934, § 13(d) and 
Schedule 13D of 
the Act, which 
required 
                                                                                                                     
47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1469 (1992); Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange, supra 
note 130, at 795. 
 320. Illinois’s score for this variable did not increase in 1940 because it was already “1” due 
to a provision in the Illinois constitution prohibiting the use of share classes with different voting 
rights for directors’ elections. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XI, § 3  (“[I]n all elections for directors 
or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall have the right to vote . . . for the 
number of shares of stock owned by him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers 
to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of 
directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock, shall equal, or to distribute them on the 
same principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit . . . .”). See Ballantine, supra note 
282, at 385. 
 321. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 565, 569 (1991). The NYSE had refused to list corporations with dual-class capitalizations 
beginning in 1926 but did not adopt a formal rule forbidding such listings until 1940. JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 585–86 (3d ed. 2003).  
 322. George W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. 
L. REV. 1, 3–4, 4 n.14 (1985) (describing the administrative history of Rule 14a-8); see also 
Mortimer M. Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer’s Role, 
37 VA. L. REV. 653, 668–70 (1951) (indicating that prior to 1942 the SEC commented that 
companies should set shareholder proposals forth in proxy soliciting materials but only 
specifically permitted a shareholder to submit a proposal at that point). 
 323. Michael, supra note 319, at 1469; Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock 
Exchange, supra note 130, at 794–95. 
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shareholders 
owning ten percent 
or more of the 
shares of an issuer 
governed by the 
Act to disclose its 
stake.324  
1970 Disclosure of 
Major 
Shareholder 
Ownership  
Delaware, Illinois, 
Model Act 
0.5 to 0.75 Ownership 
disclosure 
threshold 
applicable to 
Securities 
Exchange Act of 
1934, § 13(d) and 
Schedule 13D 
reduced to five 
percent.325 
2002 Independent 
Board Members  
Delaware, Illinois, 
Model Act 
0.25 to 1 NYSE Manual, 
§ 303A.01 
adopted.326 
2011 Dismissal of 
Directors 
Delaware, Illinois, 
Model Act 
0.5 to 0.75 The Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010 
provided 
shareholders with 
the right to an 
advisory “say on 
pay” vote.327 
D.  Our Hypotheses Revisited  
Distilling the findings thus far necessitates a return to the three 
hypotheses Part II.A. specified. The first hypothesis (H1) presupposes a 
state-driven race to the bottom and would be verified if scores fell in 
relation to those elements of shareholder protection indices determined 
by state law. The findings on balance confirm H1, but the trend is not 
robust. With the ADRI, the aggregate scores for Delaware and Illinois did 
drop when those jurisdictions displaced preemptive rights, but only by 
one point out of six.328 The Model Act’s ADRI score fell by one point in 
                                                                                                                     
 324. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454, 454 (1968) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)). 
 325. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1, 84 Stat. 1497, 1497 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. § 78m).  
 326. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 244, § 303A.01 (requiring companies to have “a majority 
of independent directors”). 
 327. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.  
 328. See supra Table 11. 
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1969 and again by one in 1984, but the decline was from a very high 
starting point.329  
With the ASDI, because of its state law elements, there again was a 
downward trend but continuity was the main theme. Between 1899 and 
the present day, on only one occasion was there state law-driven change 
to the index—the 1984 amendment to Illinois law that meant advance 
disclosure of related-party transactions was no longer even implicitly 
required.330 Finally, while under the ADRI and the ASDI changes to state 
law reduced aggregate scores, under the CBR SPI, the trend was mixed. 
State law-driven changes to this index affecting the use of share classes 
with multiple voting rights caused the scores of Delaware and Illinois to 
decline, while those relating to director dismissal and enforcement of 
directors’ duties raised the scores of Delaware, Illinois, and the Model 
Act.331 The upshot is that H1 is confirmed, but the trend was neither 
robust nor entirely uniform.  
The second and third hypotheses (H2 and H3) relate to the impact of 
federal law on shareholder protection over time. H2 presupposes that 
changes to federal law should bolster shareholder rights. The assumption 
underlying H3 is that changes to federal law were significant enough to 
outweigh any downward pressure resulting from a state-driven “race to 
the bottom.”  
H2 and H3 are strongly confirmed. Federal law was not taken into 
account with the coding of the ADRI, and each of the changes to this 
index that decreased Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act’s aggregate 
score correspondingly occurred at state, not federal, level. While federal 
law was taken into account with the ASDI, state law primarily directed 
scoring for private control of self-dealing.332 Still, with the one element 
determined by federal law—disclosure in periodic filings—federal 
reform drove scores upward in what was otherwise a very stable 
environment over time.333  
The impact of federal law was considerably more pronounced with 
the CBR SPI. Unlike with the ADRI and the ASDI, federal law (defined 
to include national stock exchange listing rules)334 had a major impact on 
the CBR SPI’s scoring for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act, with 
federal rules accounting for the scoring of five of its ten elements and 
                                                                                                                     
 329. See supra text accompanying notes 294–95. 
 330. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.  
 331. See supra Table 14. 
 332. See supra Tables 7–8. 
 333. See supra text accompanying notes 301–04. 
 334. See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text. 
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influencing a sixth.335 Overall, the aggregate CBR SPI scores for each 
jurisdiction increased markedly between 1938 and 2003,336 with changes 
to federal law accounting for most of the upward movement.337 CBR SPI 
trends correspondingly indicate that federal developments substantially 
bolstered shareholder protection (H2) and more than cancelled out 
whatever movement downward was associated with changes to state law 
(H3).  
III.  “PRESENT-DAY” BIAS? 
This study’s strong confirmation of H2 and H3 affirms the 
significance of a theme that has recently moved to the forefront of the 
literature on corporate law federalism, namely that the federal 
government is an important player.338 The weak confirmation of H1, 
combined with the strong confirmation of H2 and H3, runs contrary to a 
much better established element of the received wisdom, this being that 
competition between states eroded shareholder protection substantially 
over time. The results indicate federal intervention more than outweighed 
a weak trend in favor of diminution of shareholder protection at the state 
level, meaning that on a net basis shareholder rights became more robust 
over time.  
While the historical findings cast doubt on the received wisdom that 
jurisdictional competition resulted in a net erosion of shareholder rights 
and confirm the accuracy of the more recent theory that federal 
intervention has done much to shape shareholder protection, this 
presupposes that the selected indices measure what was really occurring. 
This cannot be taken for granted. Given the historical orientation of this 
Article’s leximetric investigation, a source of particular concern is that 
“present-day” bias taints the indices.  
This Part elaborates initially on why present-day bias is potentially a 
source of concern. It then carries out cross-checks, which indicate that 
whatever bias exists is insufficient to compromise our findings 
materially. We ultimately show that our historical analysis of corporate 
law indices provides reliable evidence that the erosion of shareholder 
protection under state law since 1900 has been modest and that a federally 
                                                                                                                     
 335. The five variables were agenda-setting power, anticipation of shareholder decision 
facilitated, prohibition of multiple voting rights, independent board members, and disclosure of 
major shareholder ownership, and the sixth was dismissal of directors. See supra Tables 9 & 10. 
With anticipation of shareholder decision facilitated, state law was potentially relevant as well. 
See supra Table 14. 
 336. See supra Figure 1. 
 337. See supra Table 15. 
 338. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 
57
Cheffins et al.: Shareholder Protection Across Time
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
748 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
oriented surge in shareholder rights has been a significant countervailing 
influence.  
A.  Reasons for Concern 
Mathias Siems, often with co-authors, has on various occasions 
suggested that when LLSV constructed the ADRI, they fell into a trap 
that comparative lawyers seek to avoid, namely imposing one’s own 
preconceptions on foreign legal systems.339 Siems maintains that LLSV’s 
inclusion of cumulative voting in the ADRI—a topic historically widely 
debated in the United States but not elsewhere—and the failure to account 
for potentially shareholder-unfriendly rules that hinder removal of 
directors betrays a pro-U.S. bias in the ADRI.340 Though plausible, 
Siems’s conjectures do not fit the facts comfortably. If the ADRI was, as 
Siems alleges, affected by a pro-U.S. bias, one might expect that this 
would translate into high scores for the supposedly favored country. It is 
true that under LLSV’s original ADRI, the United States did score “5” 
out of “6.”341 However, under DLLS’s and Spamann’s ADRI recodings, 
the U.S. aggregate score (“3” and “2” respectively) was substantially 
below the average for the countries taken into account.342  
Given that our leximetric analysis of corporate law focuses 
exclusively on the United States, it is largely immaterial to our analysis 
if the indices deployed here betray an implicit partiality for U.S. corporate 
law. There is, however, another type of bias that potentially affects these 
indices that could compromise the results, namely a tilt in favor of scores 
increasing over time. Bias of this sort is a source of concern partly 
because there are some variables in the indices we use where for 
substantial periods of time contemporaries would have been unaware that 
regulating the topic in question might have been beneficial for investors. 
Under such circumstances, the law governing U.S. corporations could not 
realistically generate positive scores for these variables. This could only 
begin to change when the value of the rules in question was recognized, 
which in turn would tend to bias upward scores from recent decades, with 
scores rising as the new rules were introduced.  
The CBR SPI variable concerning the mandating of a designated 
proportion of independent directors on the board is an example of an 
index element with a present-day bias. In 1934, future-Justice William O. 
Douglas was among the first to advocate that individuals not affiliated 
                                                                                                                     
 339. See Armour et al., supra note 49, at 349; Lele & Siems, supra note 29, at 20–21; Mathias 
M. Siems, What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s 
Methodology, 16 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 300, 301 (2005).  
 340. Lele & Siems, supra note 28, at 20–21.  
 341. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1119, 1130. 
 342. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 606, 608. 
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with management occupy a majority of board seats.343 Thus, it would be 
unrealistic to expect that the law governing U.S. corporations would have 
generated a positive score for this variable before that point.  
Even setting to one side the independent director variable, the CBR 
SPI seems particularly susceptible to present-day bias given that its 
creators selected topics they thought would form the core of international 
corporate governance “best practice” between 1995 and 2005.344 In so 
doing, as they explicitly acknowledged, they intentionally focused on a 
period when change was on the policy agenda in numerous countries.345 
Given this, it should not be surprising that, consistent with the 1995-2005 
trend for most of the twenty countries Siems–CBR coded over that 
period,346 the CBR SPI scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act 
increased by a full point out of ten between 2001 and 2003.347 For the 
period between 2006 and 2013, the CBR SPI scores for these jurisdictions 
increased again but only by a modest 0.25, opening the way for a number 
of countries to draw level with or pass the United States.348  
Present-day bias, in the form of index components with a strongly 
modern orientation, is, however, by no means an endemic feature of the 
indices this Article focuses on. For many of the components, it was 
theoretically possible for scores to be positive back to 1900. The “5” that 
Illinois had as early as 1899 using DLLS’s ADRI scoring method and the 
very high scores the Model Act had when it was introduced in 1950 
indicate that at least for the ADRI, “1”s have been more than a theoretical 
possibility for decades.349  
Another potential source of upward present-day bias with these 
indices comes from shareholder protections that may have previously 
existed but are no longer part of shareholder rights discourse. Due to their 
outdated nature, these legal protections would be unlikely candidates for 
inclusion in the ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI. The indices, therefore, may 
not capture significant shareholder protections that existed in 1900, 1910, 
or 1920 but are largely unknown today. Correspondingly, reforms that 
compromised, eroded, or abolished such rights could have diminished 
                                                                                                                     
 343. See William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1314–
15 (1934) (advocating the introduction of legislation mandating that stockholders independent of 
management should make up a majority of the board). For a discussion of Justice Douglas’s 
pioneer status, see Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 661 (“Douglas’ article set out the 
basic terms of the governance agenda that has guided corporate law reform ever since.”). Robert 
Gordon was another early advocate of mandating the appointment of independent directors. 
ROBERT AARON GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 347–50 (1945).  
 344. Armour et al., supra note 49, at 355, 374. 
 345. See id. at 353, 355. 
 346. Siems, supra note 29, at 122–23.  
 347. See supra Figure 1. 
 348. See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.  
 349. See supra Table 11. 
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shareholder protection without reducing historical scores for Delaware, 
Illinois, or the Model Act. This historical leximetric exercise could in turn 
fail to capture the abrogation or abolition of potentially significant 
shareholder rights. The next Section accounts for this aspect of present-
day bias.  
B.  What Shareholder Rights Mattered in 1929? 
A plausible cross-check against present-day bias in the indices is to 
identify what shareholder rights were thought to matter in the past and 
ascertain whether these have been eroded over time. Conducting such an 
exercise is not straightforward because those writing about corporate law 
in the opening decades of the 20th century were not constructing indices 
in the same way as LLSV, DLLS, and Siems–CBR. However, a 1929 
book by John Sears, The New Place of the Stockholder,350 provides a 
helpful substitute.  
Sears indicated that the purpose of his book “[was] to consider 
methods and practices proposed to protect the stockholder, use the 
stockholder, and help the stockholder.”351 He identified as a departure 
point “an understanding of the deeply fundamental character of the 
stockholder’s legal rights”352 and then composed a fourteen-point “list of 
strict legal rights, powers, and remedies” so “[t]hat we may more clearly 
understand where we stand.”353 This fourteen-point list can be used to 
capture a historically sensitive sense of trends concerning shareholder 
protection.  
If it transpired that there had been in the decades following the 1929 
publication of Sears’ book a substantial erosion of the protections Sears 
identified, this would suggest that the indices we have relied upon are 
seriously compromised by present-day bias. Our findings 
correspondingly would have to be discounted considerably. As we will 
see, the legal rights on Sears’ list remain largely intact today and to the 
extent they have been displaced the indices we use reflect the change. It 
follows that that the trends we have identified in fact are robust. 
Sears’ book would subsequently be overshadowed by Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means’ landmark 1932 volume, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property.354 Nevertheless, as Professor Lawrence Mitchell has 
                                                                                                                     
 350. JOHN H. SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER (1929).  
 351. Id. at 9.  
 352. Id. at 8.  
 353. Id. at 198.  
 354. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 287. For examples of other over-shadowed books, see 
Robert Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J.L. & ECON. 
273, 279 & n.20 (1983) (citing THOMAS NIXON CARVER, THE PRESENT ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN 
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observed, Sears’ views “were taken seriously” at the time of 
publication.355 The Wall Street Journal referred to The New Place of the 
Stockholder as “[o]ne of the most timely books of recent date,”356 and the 
Boston Globe described the book as “worthy” and of “genuine interest 
and value” to every stockholder.357 At least one reviewer of The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property explicitly acknowledged Sears’ book 
as a forerunner of Berle and Means’ work.358 In fact, Means cited The 
New Place of the Stockholder in a 1930 article that Berle and Means drew 
upon heavily in The Modern Corporation and Private Property.359 Sears’ 
catalog of protections available to shareholders in 1929 thus can serve as 
a fair measure of the rights shareholders assumed to be relevant at that 
moment. 
With two items on Sears’ fourteen-point list—cumulative voting and 
preemptive rights—shareholder protections available in 1929 were 
eroded in subsequent decades. In both instances, however, the topics in 
question have been taken into account for present purposes because, as 
Table 16 indicates, they are ADRI components. For every item on Sears’ 
list that the ADRI did not deal with, the rights Sears cited remain 
available to shareholders today (see Table 17). This suggests that even if 
there is an element of present-day bias in the indices used, findings 
presented here concerning shareholder protection trends remain valid.  
Table 16: Elements of Sears’ Fourteen-Point List of Shareholder 
Rights That Were Also ADRI Components—ADRI Trends 
Shareholder Right, 
Identified by 
Number of Sears’ 
List 
Sears’ 
Description 
ADRI 
Component 
ADRI Trend 
Right to Vote (#7)—
Proxy Voting 
“The right 
to . . . vote by 
proxy . . . is 
provided by statute 
Vote by Proxy 
Allowed 
DLLS: Delaware 
“1” (1899–present); 
Illinois “1” (1899–
present); Model Act 
“1” (1950–present) 
                                                                                                                     
THE UNITED STATES (1925), WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1929), and I. 
MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (1931)).  
 355. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on Compensation and 
Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 273. 
 356. New Publications: New Place of the Stockholder, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1929, at 20.  
 357. Worthy Work Treats of Stockholders’ Rights, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 7, 1929, at 4.  
 358. Robert S. Stevens, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 
634, 634 (1933) (reviewing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 287).  
 359. Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q.J. 
ECON. 561, 561 & n.1 (1930); see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Preface to BERLE & MEANS, supra 
note 287, at vi (noting Berle and Means’ reliance on this research). 
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and court 
decisions.”360 
Spamann: Delaware 
“0” (1899–present); 
Illinois “0” (1899–
present); Model Act 
“0” (1950–
present)361 
Cumulative Voting (#8) “To accumulate his 
votes in the election 
of directors, when 
statute or state 
constitution make 
this right 
compulsory, and to 
do so where such 
right is permissive 
and the certificate of 
incorporation, etc., 
provides 
therefor.”362 
Cumulative 
Voting 
Delaware “0” 
(1899–present); 
Illinois “1” (1899–
present); Model Act 
“1” (1950–69), “0” 
(1969–present)363 
Preemptive Rights 
(#11) 
“Preemptive right to 
participate in new 
issue upon increase 
of capital stock.”364 
Preemptive 
Rights 
Delaware “1” 
(1899–1967), “0” 
(1967–present); 
Illinois “1” (1899–
1982), “0” (1982–
present); Model Act 
“1” (1950–84), “0” 
(1984–present)365 
Derivative Action (#12) “To bring legal 
actions, in a 
representative 
capacity for all the 
stockholders, in the 
event directors are 
acting fraudulently 
in withholding 
suit . . . .”366 
Oppressed 
Minority 
Delaware “1” 
(1899–present); 
Illinois “1” (1899–
present); Model Act 
“1” (1950–
present)367 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 360. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202. 
 361. See supra Subsection II.B.1; Table 4 (Delaware scores); Table 5 (Illinois scores); Table 
6 (Model Act scores). 
 362. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202. 
 363. See supra notes 284–86 and accompanying text.  
 364. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202. 
 365. See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text. 
 366. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202. 
 367. See supra notes 276–80 and accompanying text. 
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Table 17: Additional Elements of Sears’ Fourteen-Point List of 
Shareholder Rights—Present-Day Situation 
Shareholder Right, 
Identified by 
Number of Sears’ 
List 
Sears’ Description Present-Day Situation 
(Delaware, Illinois, Model 
Act) 
Ultra vires (#1) “Every stockholder, however 
small, has the right to insist 
that the purposes of the 
corporation be confined to 
those stated in the charter.”368 
Individual shareholders have 
standing to challenge ultra vires 
transactions if it would be 
equitable.369 
Shareholder Voting on 
Charter Amendments 
(#2) 
“To make amendments, to 
alter the charter, the statutes 
require the vote of holders of 
various proportions of 
stock.”370 
Shareholder approval is 
generally required for 
corporations to amend their 
articles of incorporation.371  
Calling Stockholder 
Meetings (#3) 
“Power in the stockholders to 
call meetings, in the event 
that the regularly constituted 
officers fail to do so, is 
usually provided by 
statute.”372 
Where corporate legislation 
requires an annual shareholder 
meeting, individual shareholders 
have the right to demand that an 
annual meeting be held.373 
Power to Dissolve (#4) “Stockholders, usually by a 
two-thirds vote at a 
meeting . . . may dissolve the 
corporation . . . .”374 
“Every state provides for the 
voluntary dissolution of a 
corporation when authorized by 
a vote of the shareholders.”375 
Right to Assets on 
Dissolution (#5) 
“After the payment of 
corporate debts, the 
A key duty of directors during 
the winding-up process for a 
                                                                                                                     
 368. SEARS, supra note 350, at 198. 
 369. COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 4:8, at 241; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 124(1) 
(2015); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3.15(a) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 3.04(b)(1) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 2013). With the rise of general incorporation laws and broad corporate purpose 
clauses, ultra vires was largely a vestigial doctrine by the 1920s. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 59–62 (1991). 
 370. SEARS, supra note 350, at 200. Procedurally amending the articles required the directors 
to submit a proposal to the shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CORP. LAWS § 26 (1915); 32 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. § 62 (1929).  
 371. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10.20; MODEL 
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.03(b). 
 372. SEARS, supra note 350, at 200. 
 373. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 13:13, at 482–84; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 211(b); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.05; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.01. 
 374. SEARS, supra note 350, at 200–01. At the time of publication of Sears’ book, the 
procedure for the dissolution of a corporation in both Illinois and Delaware called for the board 
to present a dissolution proposal to their shareholders. Shareholders, however, could request the 
proposal. See DEL. CORP. LAWS § 39; 32 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 75. 
 375. 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 26:2, at 295; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 
(2015); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.15 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2010). 
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stockholder becomes entitled 
to his proportionate share of 
the assets of the 
company.”376 
corporation is “to distribute the 
remaining assets to the 
shareholders of the corporation 
after provision has been made for 
creditors.”377 
Right to Sell Stock (#6) “The right of alienation is an 
inseparable incident to the 
ownership of stock as it is of 
other property.”378 
“In publicly held corporations, 
free alienation of shares is a 
distinct advantage of the 
corporate form of doing 
business.”379 
Right to Vote (#7) “The stockholder is normally 
entitled to one vote for each 
share of stock . . . .”380 
“Generally, . . . each outstanding 
share of stock is entitled to one 
vote . . . .”381 
Right to Dividends (#9) “A well-known law writer 
[I.M. Wormser] believes that 
where it appears that 
dividends have erroneously 
and unfairly been detained 
from distribution to the 
stockholders for a long 
period of years, a point will 
be reached where a court of 
equity should unhesitatingly 
intervene . . . .”382  
With dividends, “[t]he 
shareholders are usually entitled 
to the amounts credited to 
them . . . . In most cases where 
dividends have been compelled, 
it has been shown that the 
directors wilfully abused their 
discretion . . . .”383  
Defend Suits on Behalf 
of the Corporation 
(#13) 
If the board’s power to 
defend suits that have been 
brought against the 
corporation is “fraudulently 
neglected, a stockholder 
might conceivably act on 
behalf of and in defense of 
the corporation.”384 
“[R]efusal to defend [by the 
board], where it partakes more of 
disregard of duty than of an error 
of judgment, or is a breach of 
trust although not involving 
intentional moral delinquency, 
warrants relief to complaining 
shareholders.”385 
Remedy Against 
Misconduct by 
Majority Shareholders 
(#14) 
“A bona fide minority 
stockholder who has 
not . . . ratified fraudulent 
acts of the majority . . . may 
sue and will be given 
appropriate remedies against 
“In broad overview, transactions 
shown to produce 
disproportionate gains to the 
controlling stockholders are 
typically judged by a standard of 
fairness . . . . [T]he burden of 
establishing the fairness of the 
                                                                                                                     
 376. SEARS, supra note 350, at 201. 
 377. 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 26:13, at 332. 
 378. SEARS, supra note 350, at 201. 
 379. COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1:5, at 16. 
 380. SEARS, supra note 350, at 201. 
 381. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 361 (1986).  
 382. SEARS, supra note 350, at 134 (footnote omitted). 
 383. 3 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, §§ 20:1–20:2, at 482, 491.  
 384. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202. 
 385. 12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 5853 (West 2015) (footnotes omitted). 
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an offending 
majority . . . .”386  
transaction is placed upon the 
controlling stockholder . . . .”387 
C.  What Shareholder Protections Were Displaced? 
While the ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI scores for Delaware, Illinois, 
and the Model Act indicate there was only a modest erosion of protection 
afforded to shareholders under state corporate law from 1899 onward, 
and although the shareholder rights identified as important by Sears in 
1929 remain largely intact today, the literature across the decades 
abounds with claims that changes to state law markedly compromised 
shareholder rights. Perhaps, then, neither the leximetric investigation 
presented here nor the historical cross-check using Sears’ fourteen-point 
list has captured fully what in fact was a prevalent trend in U.S. corporate 
law. Correspondingly, this Section identifies changes to the law 
emphasized by those who claim shareholder protection afforded by state 
law diminished considerably and assesses whether these changes were of 
sufficient importance to undermine our ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI 
findings.  
Throughout the 20th century, there were numerous assertions that 
competition between states placed shareholder rights in jeopardy. In 
1929, Berle stated that unless managerial power was subject to equitable 
control by the courts “the interest of anyone who purchases or contracts 
in respect of shares of a Delaware corporation is so hazardous from a 
legal point of view that no well informed person would care to run the 
risk.”388 In a 1930 Atlantic Monthly article, John Flynn said that the 
states’ laws were liberal “to the point of glaring laxity.”389 Future Justice-
Wiley Rutledge observed in 1937 that numerous states were following 
“the lead of Delaware,” meaning that “[t]he individual shareholder now 
has largely a ‘pig-in-a-poke.’ His old vested rights are gone or are going. 
He is made more dependent with each new statute upon the desires of the 
management . . . .”390 
In 1968, Professor Ernest Folk, who played a leading role in the 
revision of Delaware corporate law that led to the enactment of the DGCL 
of 1967, said of the approach taken, “We do not seek to protect 
shareholders or creditors or others; rather we limit their rights and 
                                                                                                                     
 386. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202. 
 387. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 11:11, at 306–07.  
 388. A. A. Berle, Jr., Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act, 29 COLUM. L. 
REV. 563, 580–81 (1929).  
 389. John T. Flynn, Why Corporations Leave Home, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1932, at 
268, 272.  
 390. Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in Modern Corporation Statutes, 22 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 305, 337 (1937). 
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remedies. We constantly enlarge the rights and freedom of 
management.”391 Finally, Professor William Cary, in a landmark 1974 
article on regulatory competition’s impact on corporate law, indicated 
that “the race for the bottom” had “watered the rights of shareholders vis-
à-vis management down to a thin gruel.”392  
What forms of shareholder protection were abrogated or compromised 
to elicit such forceful rhetoric? Throughout the 20th century, there were 
various changes to the law both in Delaware and elsewhere that bolstered 
managerial freedom of action. Did these compromise shareholder rights 
in the profound manner implied by the “race” rhetoric used in relation to 
regulatory competition by states? An analysis of major changes in state 
corporation law across the century suggests not.  
Within two years of Delaware’s 1899 enactment of a new general 
incorporation statute designed to attract incorporation business,393 
Delaware was revising the legislation to enhance managerial flexibility, 
adding a new section permitting a corporation’s certificate of 
incorporation to contain any provision not demonstrably in violation of 
the statute.394 The process continued in 1917, when Delaware explicitly 
authorized directors to sell all or substantially all of a corporation’s assets 
so long as a majority vote of the shareholders approved such action.395 
Also, following a precedent set by New York in 1912,396 in 1917 
Delaware allowed corporations to issue shares with no par value.397 In 
1928, Berle claimed that the institution of no-par stock was “[p]robably 
the greatest single step in transferring control of property rights from 
stockholders to corporate managements.”398 This change to the law did 
theoretically make it easier for directors to benefit favored investors 
inappropriately by issuing new shares cheaply.399 Still, the salutary 
                                                                                                                     
 391. Ernest L. Folk, III, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 
409, 409, 415 (1968). On Professor Folk’s role in the lawmaking process, see generally Comment, 
Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 865–
68 (1969). 
 392. Cary, supra note 11, at 666.  
 393. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, Questioning, supra note 33, at 605. 
 394. S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 
(1976). 
 395. See id. at 10 (indicating that the amendment to the Delaware law was made in response 
to a court decision that raised a doubt as to whether a company could sell all of its assets with less 
than unanimous shareholder approval).  
 396. See Wells, supra note 66, at 606.  
 397. THE CORPORATION TRUST COMPANY, BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNDER THE LAWS OF 
DELAWARE: SHARES WITHOUT PAR VALUE 14 (4th ed. 1917).  
 398. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 64 (1928). 
 399. For an overview of the perceived risks created by no-par stock, see Wells, supra note 
66, at 607. 
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flexibility of no-par value shares quickly became apparent,400 and by the 
time the 20th century drew to a close, par value was an anachronism.401  
Otherwise, few amendments were made to Delaware’s corporation 
statute until the late 1920s, when legislators made major changes to 
provisions governing corporation finance.402 At this time, Delaware 
corporations were explicitly authorized to issue stock options and to 
create large blocks of authorized but unissued “blank stock” for which 
managers could “tailor the rights and preferences of any class of stock to 
meet market conditions” at the time of issuance.403 Professor Berle 
characterized these and related changes to the Delaware legislation as 
“dangerous” and “unworkable.”404 Stock options, however, were already 
popular by the time Delaware changed its rules,405 and within a few 
decades blank stock provisions were commonplace in corporate laws.406  
The 1933 Illinois Business Corporations Act, befitting a statutory 
measure that was supposed to protect shareholders from ongoing 
abuses,407 did not bolster managerial discretion or erode shareholder 
rights dramatically as compared with other legislation of the time. For 
instance, the 1933 IBCA preserved preemptive rights even though the 
California General Corporation Law of 1931 had set a precedent for 
abolition of such rights.408 The Illinois Act likewise retained mandatory 
cumulative voting even though Delaware never went further than 
authorizing companies to “opt in” to this method of director selection in 
1919.409 Similarly, while Delaware explicitly authorized the issuance of 
stock options in the 1920s, the 1933 Illinois Act did not. It also provided 
                                                                                                                     
 400. See, e.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 316, at 473 (“The great feature of no-par shares is 
price flexibility . . . .”). 
 401. Venture Stores, Inc. v. Ryan, 678 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997); 3 COX & HAZEN, 
supra note 7, § 16:15, at 315 (“‘Par value’ is a rapidly vanishing feature of corporate law.”); cf. 
BAYLESS MANNING WITH JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 30 (3d ed. 1990) (“[P]ar stock 
continues to be in majority use.”).  
 402. Arsht, supra note 394, at 10–11. 
 403. Id. at 11; accord Berle, supra note 388, at 565–66 (discussing Delaware corporate law 
in the late 1920s). 
 404. Berle, supra note 388, at 579. 
 405. John C. Baker, Stock Options for Executives, 19 HARV. BUS. REV.  106, 106 (1940) 
(indicating that stock options “became exceedingly popular during the 1920’s”).   
 406. See E. R. Latty, Some General Observations on the New Business Corporation Law of 
New York, 11 BUFF. L. REV. 591, 597 (1962).  
 407. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 408. See Ballantine, supra note 282, at 362–63.  
 409. See ILL. REV. STAT. § 28 (1933) (repealed 1983); supra text accompanying note 315. 
But see Wesley G. Nissen, Note, The Constitutionality of the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation 
Act’s Voting Provisions, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 647, 647 (noting that the Advisory Committee to 
the Secretary of State on the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 found the 1933 provision 
for mandatory cumulative voting harmful for economic growth).   
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directors with less scope to carry out share buy-backs and declare 
dividends than Delaware offered.410 Illinois then refrained from revising 
its incorporation statute substantially until the enactment of the IBCA of 
1983.411  
Between 1929 and 1967, Delaware periodically tweaked its corporate 
law statute but did not disturb the basic structure of the legislation412 until 
concerns arose in the mid-1960s that its dominant position might be under 
threat from other states seeking to compete for incorporations by 
changing their laws to “‘out-Delaware’ Delaware.”413 Delaware enacted 
a revised statute in 1967 referred to by one critic as “a modern round of 
state charter-mongering” 414 and by another as “a prime exemplar of the 
trend away from shareholder control.”415 Whether such forceful rhetoric 
was justified is doubtful. Section II.C. has already canvassed some key 
changes made by the 1967 legislation, namely the displacement of the 
presumptive rule concerning the existence of preemptive rights and, in 
the related-party transaction context, the approval by informed, 
disinterested directors being statutorily deemed to have “the same 
insulating effect as a good faith shareholder vote.”416 Other amendments 
cited by commentators arguing the 1967 Act diluted shareholder rights 
substantially were hardly radical. The amendments cited only 
compromised in some respects the scope for appraisal rights in companies 
registered on a national stock exchange or having more than 2,000 
shareholders417 and empowered corporations to purchase directors’ and 
officers’ insurance.418  
Delaware has not engaged in a wholesale revision of its corporation 
statute since 1967. In the ensuing decades, the 1986 enactment of 
                                                                                                                     
 410. See Ballantine, supra note 282, at 363, 365, 369.  
 411. See Van Vliet, supra note 286, at 2–3.  
 412. Arsht, supra note 394, at 11. 
 413. See Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 279 (1976) (quoting interviews with Samuel Arsht, Partner, Morris, Nichols, 
Arsht & Tunnell, in Wilmington, Del. (Jan. 15, 1975), and Margaret Storey, Executive Vice 
President, Corporation Service Company, in Wilmington, Del. (Jan. 16, 1975)).  
 414. Id.  
 415. Comment, Vestiges of Shareholder Rights Under the New Delaware Corporation Law, 
57 GEO. L.J. 599, 599 (1969). 
 416. On preemptive rights, see supra note 76 and related discussion.  On Delaware’s safe 
harbor provision, see supra note 211 as well as Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1760.   
 417. See Comment, supra note 391, at 872–73; Comment, supra note 415, at 608–09. These 
commentators used sweeping language to characterize the change. Comment, supra note 391, at 
873 (“[E]ffectively eliminat[ing] appraisal rights . . . .”); Comment, supra note 415, at 609 
(“Modification of the appraisal right . . . [would be] preferable to its abolition.”). By doing this, 
they glossed over the fact that appraisal rights were preserved in a stock-for-stock merger, which 
is still current law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2015).   
 418. Comment, supra note 391, at 884–85; Comment, supra note 415, at 603.  
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Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL has been the manager-friendly change to 
Delaware law that has attracted the most attention.419 Delaware enacted 
this provision, which authorizes Delaware corporations to limit or 
eliminate personal liability for directors arising from breaches of the duty 
of care,420 in response to concerns that honest directors were exposed to 
a substantial and unjustified risk of personal liability and that the cost of 
directors’ and officers’ insurance was escalating counterproductively.421 
Given that the substantive content of directors’ duties is not addressed in 
a general way by the ADRI, ASDI, or CBR SPI, these indices do not 
capture this change to the law.  
One other area where the ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI might not 
capture significant changes in shareholder protection concerns states’ 
anti-takeover statutes. Following an unprecedented burst of hostile 
takeover activity in the 1980s, a majority of states adopted statutes that 
empowered boards to impede unwelcome takeover bids by, for instance, 
allowing boards to take into account “other constituents” beyond 
shareholders in making business decisions and temporarily removing 
would-be acquirers’ voting rights.422 Anti-takeover statutes seemingly 
reduced shareholder value.423 Therefore, the indices deployed here may 
have missed an area where shareholder protection was significantly 
weakened over time.  
On the other hand, the anti-takeover measures adopted in the 1980s 
arguably did not mark a fundamental departure from historical trends but 
rather merely confirmed that boards had substantial discretion to thwart 
takeover attempts. For instance, in Delaware—admittedly a state that 
belatedly adopted a relatively weak anti-takeover statute and one where 
the courts largely made takeover law—takeover doctrine developed 
                                                                                                                     
 419. Brown, supra note 11, at 331–32 (treating the provision as manager-friendly); Edward 
P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware General Corporation 
Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 854 (2008) (“[T]he most significant post-1967 amendment . . . .”).  
 420. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).  
 421. See James L. Griffith, Jr., Director Oversight Liability: Twenty-First Century Standards 
and Legislative Controls on Liability, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 653, 688–89 (1995); Stephen A. Radin, 
‘Smith v. Van Gorkom’ on its 15th Anniversary, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 2000, at 24, 27. 
 422. See Subramanian, supra note 66, at 1827–28 (providing summaries of anti-takeover 
statutes for the various states); see also Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 
VA. L. REV. 1973, 2040–46 (2009) (providing tables showing states with “directors’ duties 
statutes” and states following Delaware’s standards).  
 423. Subramanian, supra note 66, at 1800 (“Econometric analyses of these statutes 
consistently find that they reduce shareholder wealth . . . .”); see also Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does 
the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1801 (2002) 
(“[A] typical antitakeover statute has a negative, albeit modest, effect on shareholder value . . . .”).  
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during the 1980s may ultimately have circumscribed rather than 
enhanced board discretion.424  
The foregoing synopsis indicates that while some significant 
shareholder protections were eroded from 1900 onwards, the changes 
were not dramatic compared to changes to the legal rules this Article has 
already taken into account by performing a historical analysis with the 
ADRI, ASDI, CBR SPI, and Sears’ fourteen-point list. Correspondingly, 
while amendments to state law may have diminished shareholder 
protection to some degree, at least from 1900 onwards, the “race” 
terminology applied to trends concerning state corporate law is somewhat 
hyperbolic.  
It is possible that focusing on changes to the law occurring in the 20th 
century may not be the appropriate way to ascertain why there was a 
general consensus that competition between states for incorporation 
business caused a substantial erosion of shareholder rights. This is 
because affirmative statutory shareholder protection may never have 
been a prominent feature of 20th-century state corporate law. The two 
pivotal themes in the New Jersey corporation law of 1896—from which 
Delaware’s 1899 statute was derived—were the removal of limits 
formerly imposed on corporations and the dramatic increase in the scope 
that incorporators and directors had, relative to shareholders, to dictate 
the internal structure and operation of corporations.425 As far back as 
1899, then, Delaware’s general incorporation statute failed to specify in 
any systematic way the responsibilities of management to shareholders 
or afford to dissident shareholders substantial rights and remedies.426 
Correspondingly, the “race” that has ostensibly characterized the 
development of shareholder protections under state corporate law may 
have been largely over just as it started.  
This revised characterization of the chronology of state corporate law 
is not novel. Professors William Bratton and Joseph McCahery have said 
that “[l]egislative innovation at the state level never again reached the 
intensity experienced in the wake of New Jersey’s competitive 
initiative.”427 They have similarly observed that “the structure of state 
                                                                                                                     
 424. Ahdieh, supra note 9, at 299–300 (“Enthusiasts of federalism . . . have pointed to 
reductions in the level of resistance condoned by successive generations of state antitakeover 
statutes . . . .”). Compare Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964) (effectively applying 
the business judgment rule to takeover defenses), with Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985) (applying a more searching two-prong test for evaluating board use 
of defensive tactics to fend off an unwelcome takeover bid).  
 425. Wells, supra note 66, at 584.   
 426. Kenneth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 
1298 (1952); see also Arsht, supra note 394, at 8 (“[T]he 1899 Act was largely silent with respect 
to the standards to be adhered to by officers and directors in the performance of their duties . . . .”). 
 427. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 631.  
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[corporate] law showed remarkable stability between 1896 and the 
takeover wars of the 1980s, and that structure was determined in a 
manifestly competitive environment,” referring with respect to the 1980s 
to the introduction of anti-takeover legislation in that decade.428 William 
Cary has similarly suggested that Delaware had “a modern and ‘liberal’ 
act” by 1915.429  
These observations accord with historical patterns as measured by the 
ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI: there was no dramatic erosion of shareholder 
rights during the period analyzed, at least with respect to state law. Some 
statutory amendments occurring in the 20th century did elicit strong 
reactions. Nevertheless, Bratton and McCahery’s characterization of 
20th-century rounds of innovation as “minor adjustments to a stable legal 
regime” appears to be on the mark.430 Leximetric analysis indicates 
changes to state law did not fundamentally compromise shareholder 
rights after 1899.  
If a substantial erosion of shareholder protection was not in fact a 
hallmark of state corporate law in the United States from 1899 onwards, 
was there ever a robust race to the bottom? To the extent it did happen, 
the closing decades of the 19th century stand out as the crucial period. It 
has been said that “American corporate law lost a substantial part of its 
regulatory content from the 1880s”431 and that “the position of minority 
shareholders in corporations if anything became weaker” as the 19th 
century drew to a close.432 This Article leaves it to others to verify these 
claims. From 1899 onwards, however, general trends concerning state 
corporate law in the United States appear to accord with the empirical 
findings that a “race” did not compromise fundamentally shareholder 
rights under state corporate law.  
CONCLUSION 
Today, the general consensus is that U.S. law offers less robust 
shareholder protection than other comparable countries’ laws. To the 
extent this is the case, the pattern can be attributed most obviously to a 
central and distinctive feature of U.S. corporate law, namely competition 
between states for incorporation business stemming from the ability of 
corporations to incorporate under the law of a state different from the one 
in which they are headquartered. Although there has been acrimonious 
debate over whether competition between states has produced a legal 
                                                                                                                     
 428. Id. at 646.  
 429. Cary, supra note 11, at 664–65. 
 430. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 635.  
 431. P. M. Vasudev, Corporate Law and Its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 237, 260 (2008–10). 
 432. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Scylla or Charybdis? Historical Reflections on Two Basic 
Problems of Corporate Governance, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 9, 21 (2009).  
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regime that disproportionately disempowers shareholders to managers’ 
benefit (and so been a “race to the bottom”) or instead has prodded states 
to develop corporate law that enhances shareholder wealth (and so been 
a “race to the top”), there has been general agreement that shareholder 
rights have diminished over time. This Article has deployed empirical 
analysis to discern how shareholder protection has evolved over time and 
casts doubt on this received wisdom. In so doing, it has made three major 
contributions to the literature on corporate law and shareholder 
protection. 
First, this Article presents a fresh way to track quantitatively the 
development of U.S. corporation law over time. Using indices originally 
developed to compare shareholder protections across nations, it charts the 
development of three vital bodies of U.S. corporate law, those of 
Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Business Corporation Act, since the 
turn of the 20th century. The nature of these findings suggests 
quantitative analysis of the development of corporate law over time could 
be deployed effectively to provide insights in other contexts.  
Second, the Article uses quantitative analysis to cast new light on the 
nature of jurisdictional competition between states. Its deployment of 
leximetric analysis indicates, for instance, that shareholder protections 
offered by state law have eroded over the past century. This erosion was 
generally modest, however, suggesting that if there was a meaningful race 
to the bottom (or top), it did not occur from 1900 onwards.  
This Article’s third and final significant contribution is to put into 
context the federal government’s role in affording shareholders 
protection. We have demonstrated quantitatively that federally-oriented 
reform has considerably bolstered shareholder rights over time and 
indeed has more than offset whatever diminution occurred due to state 
law changes. Today’s shareholders, at least those in public corporations, 
are better protected by the current amalgam of state and federal 
“corporation law,” including stock exchange listing rules, than were 
shareholders of a century or even a half-century ago. This Article 
correspondingly shows that there has not been a steady erosion of 
shareholder rights in the period under scrutiny, at least once the 
significant effect of federal intervention is taken into account. Moreover, 
the level of protection shareholders currently enjoy is reasonably high by 
global standards.  
For present purposes, this Article leaves open the normative 
implications of the identified trends. This is because assessing the 
desirability of shareholder protection is anything but straightforward. 
While this Article indicates that shareholders were offered greater 
protection overall over time, it is possible the costs of such additional 
protection may have outweighed the benefits. Views expressed by those 
in the “race-to-the-top” camp illustrate the point. Given that the “race-to-
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the-bottom” theory presupposes a sacrificing of shareholder rights in 
favor of managerial flexibility, it might seem to follow that a “race to the 
top” would imply fortification of shareholder rights. To the extent that 
this is correct, “race-to-the-top” advocates seemingly should have 
welcomed the federal interventions that pushed scores upward. Their 
reaction in fact was largely the opposite.433 What they admire about state 
corporate law, and dislike about federal corporate law, relates to choice 
rather than content. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has observed, “States 
can’t harm investors . . . . [I]f they make bad laws, capital migrates 
elsewhere. . . . If Congress makes a mistake, it is not automatically 
undercut by market forces.”434  
The ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI do not purport to measure regulatory 
style. Instead, they focus on the presence or absence of rules that can offer 
protection to shareholders. Correspondingly, this Article’s historically-
oriented leximetric analysis does not provide an appropriate basis for 
evaluating whether the sort of race that “race-to-the-top” advocates favor 
has been a dominant feature of U.S. corporate law over time. More 
broadly, this Article leaves it to others to assess the normative 
implications of its findings. This Article provides an unprecedentedly rich 
understanding of trends relating to shareholder protection that offers an 
improved foundation for policy analysis. 
  
                                                                                                                     
 433. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–43 (2005) (canvassing the empirical evidence 
relating to four key changes SOX made); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Markets vs. Regulatory 
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 
11–18, 57–61 (2002) (critiquing key SOX provisions and advocating state-led corporate law). 
 434. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 685, 698 (2009); accord Romano, supra note 20, at 216; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The 
“Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation 
Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 921–22 (1982) (“In the context of the market for corporate charters, 
this means that only states (such as Delaware) which have corporation laws that enable private 
parties to maximize their joint welfare without undue regulatory interference will attract a high 
percentage of incorporations.”). 
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